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DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF SECURED CREDIT
JAMES J. WHITE*
INTRODUCTION**
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the Code) posed palpable threats to
secured creditors. It was drafted by a commission that was at least as concerned
with the rights of debtors as with the rights of creditors. It was modified and
adopted by a Congress that might have been the most liberal since World War II
and signed into law by President Carter at the apogee of the left's power, two years
before the Reagan election that marked the rise of the right and the beginning of the
left's decline. The power of the left was exerted most forcefully on behalf of
consumer debtors who are not the subject of this paper.
In matters of commercial debt and in contests between secured commercial
creditors and unsecured commercial creditors, the distance between the
congressional poles was much less than it was in the consumer's case. But even in
commercial cases one could expect politics to intrude. In a large commercial
bankruptcy many of the unsecured creditors would regard the left as their patron.
For example union members whose interests appear as present unsecured creditors
and as potential future employees of a business in reorganization, might look to the
Democrats in Congress to protect their rights in a reorganization against the
competing secured claims of banks and other financial institutions.
Because of the composition of the Congressional right and of the academic
right, the influence of the right was even weaker in 1978 and in the preceding five
years of the Commission's work than might otherwise appear. Newt Gingrich was
first elected to Congress in 1978 and was no part of the action that led to the Code's
passage in that year; Richard Posner first came to fame by publishing "Economic
Analysis of Law" in 1978. Few free market law and economic scholars were
around to make the cruel argument that society would prosper if the free market
were allowed to kill off weak and inefficient companies.' That the dismissed
workers of a dead company might be better off in the long run as a result of that
death (or that a competitor's workers would be) was hardly considered. The
incantation, "reorganization, yes, liquidation, no" echoed through the Commissions
. Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I thank Kevin Burke and John
Marfoe, Michigan '05, for their research assistance.
*" In preparing this article I interviewed more than a dozen lawyers who routinely represent parties in
chapter 11 cases of public companies.
In recent years, many have written on this topic, as will be discussed below. See Michael Bradley &
Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1088-89 (1992) (suggesting
chapter 11 leads to no economic benefits and great social cost, and calling for its repeal or drastic overhaul);
Martin J. Whitman et al. , A Rejoinder to "The Untenable Case for Chapter 11," 2 J. BANKR. L. PRAc. 839,
841-42 (1993) (noting effectiveness of capital markets in determining which firms are best reorganized and
which should go out of business); A. Pressman, Can Chapter 11 Be Put Back Together? INVESTMENT
DEALER'S DIG., Apr. 27, 1992, at 16.
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meetings and in the halls of Congress. z Firms should be given every chance to save
their goodwill; no one seems to have thought much of the firms with badwill that
could be liquidated for a greater sum than they would command as going concerns,
nor did anyone seem to believe that a large percentage of firms that would use
chapter 11 might possess badwill, not good. So even in 1978 and certainly in the
years during the Commission's work, the right was a pale and moderate version of
its later self, and many of the arguments one might hear from the law and economic
crowd today were but whispers then.
And the pros from the bankruptcy bar that were most deeply involved in the
drafting and lobbying process also probably held the view that reorganization was
to be favored and liquidation avoided. Most influential was a group of bankruptcy
lawyers, academics, and judges that made up the National Bankruptcy Conference
(NBC)3 who, as Professor David A. Skeel, Jr. succinctly put it, "sought to transform
bankruptcy from a mildly unsavory, often archaic practice to a more useful,
attractive, and reputable response to financial distress. 'Perfecting' the bankruptcy
laws had been the National Bankruptcy Conference's main mission since the 1930s,
and the 1970s reforms were very much in this spirit.",
4
As I have suggested elsewhere 5 the bankruptcy lawyer members of the NBC
would be natural beneficiaries of a flourishing reorganization practice. Their
private interests did not lie in measures that might allow a determined secured
creditor to abort a reorganization when it appeared that a firm should be liquidated.
Reorganization was their game, and, for some, I suspect that reorganizations under
the Code could not be too long or too complex.
It is likely, as Professor Markell has suggested in his criticism of a draft of this
paper, that part of the secured creditors' difficulties arose from the fact that secured
creditors asked for the wrong things in the negotiation of the Code. For example,
secured creditors apparently argued hard for 1 I1 (b)(2), a provision that they would
gladly throw overboard now. Perhaps the secured creditors' negotiators can be
forgiven for not anticipating the developments in public chapter 11 cases that I
describe in Parts II through VI infra.
For these political reasons it is no surprise to see consumer debtors make great
gains in the Code, to see non-consumer creditors such as union employees gain
ground against more affluent institutional creditors,6 and to see the petit
bourgeoisie-the trade creditors-do better than the institutional secured and
2 See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I, at 23 (1973) (referring to problems impeding successful reorganizations
of troubled businesses); id. at 27-29 (suggesting specific reforms in order to create more favorable
environment for reorganization).
3 See generally DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA
74 (Princeton Univ. Press 2001) (discussing history and formation of National Bankruptcy Conference).
4 Id. at 149-50.
See James J. White, Comment, Harvey's Silence, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 467, 467-68 (1995) (suggesting
provision for quick liquidation would eliminate work for National Bankruptcy Commission members).
6 Here, I focus on secured credit but many of the arguments I make, could be made about institutional
unsecured creditors (e.g. unsecured bond and bank debt). I suspect that many who appear at filing as secured
institutional creditors started out as unsecured creditors and took security only when the clouds thickened.
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unsecured creditors. One would also expect to see the power of the commercial
debtor strengthened-so to insure that reorganization, not liquidation, results in any
close case.
Many writing at the time of the Code's enactment and during its early years
emphasized the dangers that bankruptcy-as represented by the Code-presented to
secured creditors. In a 1984 article Professors Baird and Jackson explain that junior
parties who do not bear the true cost of their decisions will try to keep the firm
together and that judges who have concluded (or assumed) that reorganization is the
only goal of chapter 11 will assist these parties, all to the injury of the seniors.
7
Professor Eisenberg makes a similar point by noting that the quest for "going
concern value" should, but often will not, take account of the price of that quest
which will be charged to the secured creditors' bill.8 Others expressed similar
concerns about the stay, adequate protection and the debtor's enhanced rights to use
and dispose of collateral. 9 Some of these authors explicitly address the enlargement
of the dangers from the Code; others do so only implicitly.
7 Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse
Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 97, 126-27 (1984):
A Chapter 11 proceeding typically buys time for the managers, the shareholders, and
other junior owners at the expense of the more senior ones ....
Bankruptcy judges sometimes seem inclined to do little to remedy this state of
affairs. A few seem to show either an inability or unwillingness to comprehend the
possibility that secured credit may be something more than a perverse and unfair
creature of state law that should be thwarted at every possible turn. Even more
remarkable is their wonderful capacity for hope, their unshakeable faith that given time,
the firm's ship will come in. Often, bankruptcy judges seem to think that markets
systematically undervalue firms that have filed petitions in bankruptcy. A bankruptcy
judge may insist that he, not the market, is the best one positioned to set a value on a
firm in distress, even though year after year in case after case his valuations prove
wildly inflated.
Id.
8 Theodore Eisenberg, The Undersecured Creditor in Reorganizations and the Nature of Security, 38
VAND. L. REV. 931, 958-60 (1985):
The creditors' bargain model assumes that creditors, secured, and unsecured, will
find it advantageous to agree upon a collective proceeding in which to deal with
financially troubled debtors. It is not clear, however, that secured creditors would or
should agree in advance to the treatment of secured credit in the current bankruptcy
system. Although secured creditors might. find the idea of a collective proceeding
attractive, on closer examination they would find that the current collective proceeding
imposes distinctly unattractive burdens on them. Bankruptcy provisions such as the
automatic stay and the trustee's power to use or sell collateral impose costs and risks on
secured creditors without giving them any payoff other than allowing them to recover
what they would have recovered under state law in the absence of bankruptcy
proceedings. Indeed, the benefits of the bankruptcy provisions affecting secured
creditors rights usually rest with unsecured creditors. For secured creditors, bankruptcy
imposes risks without corresponding rewards.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
9 See Sheridan Downey III et al., The Proposed Bankruptcy Reorganization Provisions: A Comparison of
the Current Law with Chapter 11 of H.R. 8200 and S. 2266, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567, 583-85 (1978):
ABILAWREVIEW
Even a mildly neurotic secured creditor could see many threats in the new law.
In the new chapter 11 the power of the courts, of the debtor and of any trustee
against a secured creditor were larger than the powers of those persons under the
dominant form of reorganization before 1978. Under chapter XI of the Act of 1898
(the Act) neither the debtor, nor a trustee nor, generally, the court could affect the
rights of a secured creditor.'0 While a court could issue a stay and so prevent
repossession, it lacked the power to deal with a secured creditor's rights in a plan of
reorganization. If the collateral was an important asset, in theory at least, the
secured creditor could refuse to give up its interest and so forestall a reorganization.
Chapter X is the most flexible of the reorganization proceedings . . . permitting the
alteration of the rights of both secured and unsecured creditors as well as those of
stockholders ....
In sharp contrast to the provisions of Chapter X, 'it is uniformly recognized that
the rights of secured creditors cannot be affected or modified' by a Chapter XI plan of
arrangement...
... IT]he ability to affect secured debt in the single reorganization chapter of the
proposed act provides a flexibility that currently is available only in the otherwise
restrictive Chapter X.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The article discusses in particular the ability of the debtor to impair or leave
unimpaired debts, the automatic stay, and the ability of the debtor to use, sell, or lease property of the estate.
See id; Robert A. James & J. David Kirkland, Jr., Adequate Protection Through Augmented Interests in
Reorganization Plans, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69, 74-75 (1984):
The general insensitivity of courts to damages for prejudgment delay, and the pursuit of
other bankruptcy goals, most notably that of avoiding piecemeal liquidations, may
explain why secured parties are given less compensation than the absolute equality of
value demanded by the [creditors] bargain model . . . . Adequate protection in
American bankruptcy law is designed to perform this compensatory role, even if it does
not compensate fully; it gives value to secured creditors suffering one category of
economic loss resulting from their inability to reclaim collateral.
Id. (footnotes omitted, emphasis added); John Lindon Smaha, Automatic Stay Under the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code: An Equitable Roadblock to Secured Creditor Relief 17 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1113, 1134-35 (1980):
The new Code, even with adequate protection, can result in inequitable treatment of
secured creditors. While the Code and the concept of bankruptcy seek to foster many
important social goals, it would be improvident to require that secured creditors carry
the burden of every debtor's rehabilitation effort. If the spirit of equity is truly the habit
of fairness and justness and rendering to every man his due, the concepts of bankruptcy
and automatic stay have a long way to evolve.
Id; cf Daniel T. Tyukody, Jr., Good Faith Inquiries Under the Bankruptcy Cod Treating the Symptom, Not
the Cause, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 795, 815 (1985):
Secured creditors object to bankruptcy petitions because bankruptcy courts do not
grant the adequate protection required by the Code and predicted by the creditor's
bargain model. Bankruptcy courts have consistently refused to grant secured creditors
the time value of their investment. Moreover, the courts tend to overestimate the value
of the secured creditor's collateral. Through such overvaluation, the courts are led to
assert that the collateral fully protects the secured creditor's claim when, in fact, it does
not. These valuation problems result from the actions of courts, not of debtors; to
decide the question created by these valuation problems in terms of the debtor's good
faith is to miss the point.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
10 Bankruptcy Act 356, 11 U.S.C. § 756 (repealed 1978) (permitted modification only of rights of
unsecured creditors).
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While a clever court and debtor might conspire to make it worthwhile for a secured
creditor to agree to a reorganization, they could not force it.
In every case under the new chapter 11, the courts and the debtor in possession
had all of the rights and more than a court and trustee would have had under chapter
X of the Act. Under the Act, large companies were supposed to go into chapter X
and smaller ones into chapter XI. For reasons too complicated to deal with here,
few went into chapter X and many that should have been in chapter X used chapter
XI. So the Code's largest threat was that the bankruptcy judges and the DIP would
have the right to mess with the collateral in every reorganization where, formerly,
that right was available only infrequently and at the cost of suffering the
inefficiencies and aggravations of chapter X.
It must also have been threatening for the Code to spell out the rights of the DIP
in such detail. Even if these rights had existed in old chapter X, many were buried
in cases, rules or practices." In the Code they were put out front, in the black letter
so that even the slowest DIP lawyer could find and assert them. Consider some of
these rights.
First is the automatic stay of section 362.2 On filing of the petition, a creditor is
automatically. stayed from doing anything that might look, feel or smell like the
collection of a debt. The secured creditor could not repossess. Even if he had
repossessed, he could not sell. That a secured creditor could get "adequate
protection" was cold comfort, for what was "adequate" was at the discretion of the
judge, and the judge might find that a mortgage on a rusting plant was adequate
protection for the impairment of a security interest in some A+ accounts receivable.
Moreover the court might not find a need to protect the creditor's entire position or
might conclude that the collateral was not decreasing in value (as the creditor
claimed) and thus no protection would be needed.
It was not always so clear that the stay, which was frequently imposed under
chapter XI, could stop a foreclosure proceeding that had begun before the
'l See Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 343-44 (1911) (indicating no post-petition interest for secured
creditor for amount above security interest); In re J.S. Gissel & Co., 238 F. Supp. 130, 134 (S.D. Tex. 1965)
(foreclosing ship mortgage commenced prior to chapter X proceedings enjoined).
12 Stay was automatic under chapter X, but was up to the discretion of the judge under chapter XI; 11
U.S.C. § 548 (1967) (repealed 1978) (stating "Until otherwise ordered by the judge, an order approving a
petition shall operate as a stay of a prior pending bankruptcy, mortgage foreclosure, or equity receivership
proceeding, and of any act or other proceeding to enforce a lien against the debtor's property."); 11 U.S.C. §
714 (1967) (repealed 1978):
The court may, in addition to the relief provided by section 11 of this Act and
elsewhere under this chapter, enjoin or stay until final decree the commencement or
continuation of suits other than suits to enforce liens upon the property of a debtor, and
may, upon notice and for cause shown, enjoin or stay until final decree any act or the




bankruptcy was filed.' 3 Section 362 clearly stopped foreclosures in their tracks, and
after Whiting Pools 14 did so even with respect to personal property that had been
repossessed before the filing.
Second was the expansive right in section 363 for the DIP to use and even sell
collateral. Kmart can sell and United Airlines can fly the creditors' collateral. Here
too the court could limit such use, but courts that saw a mandate to foster
reorganizations and to avoid liquidations would not favor the secured creditors'
arguments. Under 363, use and sale in the ordinary course do not require a court's
or the creditor's approval, but such approval surely would have been necessary
under chapter XI and likely so under chapter X.1
5
Third was section 506(b) that appeared to cut off interest liability of the debtor
except to the extent that the value of the collateral exceeded the amount of the debt.
That meant that if the debtor airline owed $500 million secured by aircraft worth
$499 million, there was no obligation during the reorganization proceeding to pay
or accrue interest on the debt. If a reorganization proceeding could be expected to
last three or four years when interest rates were at 10 percent, it meant that the
creditor stood to lose the right and opportunity to earn $50 million of interest each
year. In making its interest calculation, every secured creditor had to consider the
risk that it might have to extend an interest free loan for a undetermined period.
The right of the DIP to control the reorganization was apparently insured by
section 1121's grant of a 120 day exclusivity period. Of course, creditors feared
that judges would extend the exclusivity period as they had the power to do so.
During that period the DIP could make its own plan, negotiate with various
creditors and conceivably get a plan approved that disfavored one or more creditors
while that creditor was barred from even proposing an alternative plan.
Finally the Code explicitly granted the power to "cramdown" a plan over the
objection of a secured creditor provided the plan met the requirements of section
1129, particularly that it promised the secured creditor a stream of payments with a
present value equal to the value of the collateral. 16 A secured creditor did not have
13 See In re Lane Foods, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 133, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (holding bankruptcy referee had
jurisdiction for stay even though warrant for execution had already been obtained where creditor landlord
obtained warrant for eviction prior to filing chapter XI, but failed to execute it).
14 United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 200-01 (1983) (stating section 362(a) is inapplicable
to IRS).
15 See H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 17:
The procedures required by the Act in the sale of property of a bankrupt estate have
been much criticized for the inordinate administrative detail and expense. The trustee
must ordinarily obtain court approval in the form of an order permitting the sale;
creditors must ordinarily be notified of any proposed sale; the property must ordinarily
be appraised; the sale must ordinarily be a public sale; and the trustee's sale is subject to
approval or disapproval by the court.
Id.
16 A similar provision existed under X; 11 U.S.C. § 616(7) (1967) (repealed 1978). Providing plan:
shall provide for any class of creditors which is affected by and does not accept the plan
by the two-thirds majority in amount required under this chapter, adequate protection
for the realization by them of the value of their claims against the property dealt with
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to be paranoid to fear that a judge might find that its collateral was worth less than
the creditor thought or apply too high a discount rate-so limiting the secured
creditor to a stream of payments with a smaller value than the creditor believed its
collateral had.
The Code inflicted many other small cuts on the secured creditor. It expanded
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to allow the debtor to bring a recalcitrant secured
creditor into that court, a forum thought more favorable to the debtor than some
remote state or federal court might be. Preference law was strengthened by adding
a reach of one year for insiders, by the omission of the reasonable cause to believe
requirement, and by the addition of a presumption of insolvency during the 90 days
before the petition was filed. And section 364(d)'s authority for post-petition
priming credit must have frightened secured creditors who did not wish to be DIP
lenders. 
17
Some of the secured creditors' fears about the Code were soon borne out. First
the cases affirmed that the bankruptcy court's new jurisdiction reached well beyond
the boundaries that had existed. A court's jurisdiction over particular property
under the Act of 1898 depended in many cases on the debtor's possession of that
property. 18 Shortly after the Code became effective, a series of lower court cases
held that goods that had been repossessed prior to the filing were nevertheless part
of the estate, subject to the stay, and liable to be turned over to the debtor.19 This
line of cases was capped by a 1983 Supreme Court decision, Whiting Pools, where
the Court held that even the supreme creditor, the Internal Revenue Service, had to
turn back assets that it had taken from the debtor before it filed. By reaching back
to acts done before the filing these cases diminished a secured creditor's incentive to
hasten toward a repossession, for the expense and effort of such a repossession or
by the plan and affected by such claims, either as provided in the plan or in the order
confirming the plan, (a) by the transfer or sale, or by the retention by the debtor, of such
property subject to such claims; or (b) by a sale of such property free of such claims, at
not less than a fair upset price, and the transfer of such claims to the proceeds of such
sale; or (c) by appraisal and payment in cash of the value of such claims; or (d) by such
method as will, under and consistent with the circumstances of the particular case,
equitably and fairly provide such protection.
Id.
17 Ironically, as will be shown below, this came to protect secured creditors rather than injure them,
through the ability of the DIP lender to control the terms of the DIP lending agreement.
18 See BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL section 6.01, at 6-3
(15th ed. 1986) (finding court to only have jurisdiction over property either actually or constructively
possessed by debtor on date of bankruptcy). In addition, the court had personal jurisdiction over debtor and
other persons who consented to court's jurisdiction. Id. By basing jurisdiction on possession or consent,
however, many disputes that arose in bankruptcy cases fell outside scope of the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction and therefore had to be adjudicated in non-bankruptcy state or federal courts. Id.
19 See In re Day Res. & Dev. Co., Inc., 21 B.R. 176, 177-78 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1982) (ordering bank to turn
over property subject to adequate protection plan); In re King, 14 B.R. 316, 317-18 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1981) (ordering financial corporation to turn over truck repossessed prior to debtor's bankruptcy filing); In re
Gunder, 8 BR. 390, 392-93 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (ordering bank to turn over automobile repossessed
prior to debtor's bankruptcy filing); In re Shockley Forest Indus., Inc., 5 BR. 160, 162-63 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1980) (finding bank holding mortgage on real property subject to court's turnover order).
2004]
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partial foreclosure would be for naught if the debtor filed shortly after the assets
were taken from the debtor's possession.
Second the cases shortly found that "adequate protection" did not quite maintain
the status quo ante. Assume an uncommonly vigilant secured creditor who not only
insisted that his debtor hold collateral equal to 120% of the debt but, mirabile dictu,
also enforced that requirement by diligent monitoring and by refusing to extend
additional credit unless the ratio was maintained. In 1978 that creditor might have
believed that section 361(3)'s promise to preserve the "indubitable equivalent" of
his interest "in such property" would mean that his ratio of collateral to debt would
be maintained during the bankruptcy. Those hopes were ended by Judge Maybe's
decision in In re Alyucan.
20
Alyucan and cases following it21 concluded that only that part of the collateral
equal to the amount of the debt was entitled to adequate protection. To add insult to
injury the Court found that the "equity cushion," here the 20%, could itself be
regarded as adequate protection for the 100%. Our vigilant creditor was punished
for his vigilance by being forced to devour his own collateral. On the other hand
his brother-a prodigal son who had allowed his collateral to shrink to the amount
of the debt-was entitled to new security as adequate protection.
A third disappointment for secured creditors arose from bankruptcy courts'
early practice in routinely extending the "exclusivity" period during which only the
debtor could propose a plan of reorganization.22 Under section 1121 only the debtor
can file a plan for the first 120 days of a chapter 11 case. For that period a debtor
need not fear a competing plan from secured or unsecured creditors and has an
accordingly reduced incentive either to hasten its plan to a vote or to bargain with
its creditors over a plan. In Manville the court extended exclusivity 5 times and in
Ames Group 9 times. These decisions seemed to portend that chapter 11 would take
the wretched course of railroad reorganizations where railroads lingered in
bankruptcy for decades.23 Long delays are hurtful to secured creditors not only
because they increase the risk that collateral will decline in value or be dissipated,
but also because they constitute an interest free unilateral extension of an existing
loan.
That most secured and all unsecured loans would be interest free during the
bankruptcy was confirmed by the Supreme Court in the 1988 case Timbers of
20 In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 B.R. 803, 809-10 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (rejecting equity cushion
analysis).
21 See, e.g., In re Lee, 11 B.R. 84, 85 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (recognizing equity cushions to satisfy
adequate protection); In re Orlando Coals, Inc., 6 B.R. 721, 723-24 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1980) (same); In re
5-Leaf Clover Corp., 6 BR. 463, 466-67 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1980) (noting that dissipated equity cushions
no longer provide adequate protection for secured creditors).
22 See Richard M. Cieri et al., Applying an Ax When a Scalpel Will Do: The Role of Exclusivity in Chapter
11 Reform, 2 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 397, 410 n.53 (1993) (listing cases where exclusivity was extended
several times.
23 See Florence de Haas Dembitz, Progress and Delay in Railroad Reorganizations Since 1933, 7 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 393, 407 (1940) (positing reasons for delay and expense in railroad reorganizations).
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Inwood.24 A secured creditor could make a powerful argument that the "indubitable
equivalent" of its interest in its collateral included the opportunity to liquidate the
collateral and invest the proceeds elsewhere--or alternatively that it receive interest
during the bankruptcy. This right to liquidate, so the argument goes, was an
opportunity that was part of the secured creditor's bargain and so should be
recognized as part of the secured creditor's "interest." Against this argument was
the statement in section 506 that explicitly granted interest to secured creditors to
the extent that the value of their collateral exceeded the amount of the debt. Did
that rule also contain an implication that one whose collateral did not exceed the
amount of the debt was not entitled to interest? In Timbers the Court found that
implication in section 506 and rejected the counter argument from section 361.
That secured creditors could expect no interest during the pendency of a chapter
11 proceeding magnified their concern over courts' willingness repeatedly to extend
the exclusivity period. Note too that the debtor's escape from interest liability on its
secured debt enabled a debtor to devote its cash flow to other needs and diminished
its incentive to get out of chapter 11. Why should one venture into a world where
one's competitors were paying 8 or 10 percent for their money when interest free
money could be enjoyed behind the bankruptcy court's shield?
A fifth threat that the early cases confirmed arose from the bankruptcy court's
discretion to shape adequate protection to its fancy. While section 362 and 363
promised adequate protection to the secured creditor and section 361 assured a
version of Judge Hand's elegant "indubitable equivalence," in reality every
bankruptcy judge had wide discretion in determining the length and breadth of
adequate protection. The forms specified in section 361 are only examples and
other forms of adequate protection could be as long or as short as the judge's
imagination. For example a secured creditor who held a security interest in high
quality accounts receivable at the start of the case might fear that the DIP would use
the proceeds of his receivables and substitute a mortgage on a rusty factory of
"equal value." While security in the former might be much more valuable than
security in the latter, convincing a hostile judge of that (or overturning a contrary
finding on appeal) would be hard. To prove that a stream payment or some other
asset has a greater or smaller value than some other apparently comparable asset
might require expert testimony and, in a big case, days of hearings with no certainty
of success in front of a judge who might be hell bent on seeing a confirmed
reorganization.
Finally courts' unwillingness to permit sales,25 early in the chapter 11
proceeding, of all or most of the assets of chapter 11 debtors seemed to close a door
24 United Sav. Assoc. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1988).
Of course, section 506(b) allows interest to the extent that the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of
the secured debt. See 11 U.S.C § 506(b) (2002) (allowing postpetition interest to be paid from security
cushion, if any).
25 See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways,
Inc.), 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983) (requiring district courts to "scale the hurdles" erected in chapter II
before approving sale of asset transactions); see also Inst. Creditors of Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v. Cont'l Air
2004]
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that offered an escape from a long chapter 11 proceeding. Shortly after it filed in
May of 1982, Braniff Airlines had agreed to discontinue operations and to sell most
of its assets to PSA, a west coast airline.2 6 The employees and unsecured creditors
objected to a sale that would have foreclosed the possibility of 
a reorganization.2 7
Those objecting argued that such a sale deprived them of the protections built into
section. 1129 and into the rules on voting and negotiation that apply to plan
approval. 28 The Court refused to allow an early sale under 363 in the hope of a
successful reorganization. 29 In the end Braniff failed to reorganize and the secured
creditors doubtless suffered losses from depreciation of their collateral as well as
the loss of the time value of their money from the delay.3 °
The thesis of this paper is that the predictions from the Code and the early
interpretations of the Code have proved wrong. I believe that chapter I Is of public
companies now form a market that facilitates dealings among secured and
unsecured creditors, debtors, employees and others. In that market, the secured
creditor has achieved a power and status (as this is written in 2004) that at least
equals his status prior to the Code and, perhaps, exceeds it.. In this paper I consider
31
only secured creditors in chapter 11 cases of public companies.
Secured creditors have achieved this resurrection by clever use of the provisions
of the Code and, more importantly, by using their economic power to get
agreements from debtors and debtors in possession that mitigate the sting of
injurious provisions of the Code. Part of the sting of these provisions has been
removed by changes in bankruptcy judges' attitudes and by creditors' guiding
debtors to courts where judges might be sympathetic to the secured creditors'
arguments and to the enforcement of agreements between debtors or DIP's and their
secured creditors.
I divide the discussion into five major subjects:
I. Change in judicial attitude concerning the time that a debtor should be
allowed to linger in bankruptcy.
II. Securitization and other security substitutes that remove assets from
bankruptcy's reach.
Lines, Inc. (In re Cont'l Air Lines, Inc.), 780 F.2d 1223, 1227-28 (5th Cir. 1986) (remanding to determine
whether debtor used section 363(b) to sidestep protections creditors would have otherwise received); Comm.
of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding sale
of 82 % stock interest improper because it ignored creditors' equity interests).
26 In re BraniffAirways, Inc., 700 F.2d at 938-39.
27 Id. at 940.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 See In re Braniff, Inc., 110 B.R. 980, 981-82 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (stating company created
pursuant to Braniff s reorganization plan subsequently filed for bankruptcy as well); see also Gregory G.
Hesse, On the Edge: Defense to Chapter 22, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22, 22 (1998) (noting Braniff has
failed to reorganize); Grant Newton & Paul Wertheim, Examining the Impact from the Repeal of the Stock-
for-Debt Exception, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 355, 366-67 (1995) (listing Braniff Airlines as failed
reorganization).
31 It is possible that secured creditors have fared worse in small chapter I ls and in consumer bankruptcies,
but I doubt it.
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III. Early liquidation under section 363.
IV. Secured creditors' use of creditor protecting provisions in section such as
507(b), 547(c) and 1129.
V. Elevation and protection of secured creditors' claims by agreement with the
debtor.
I. CHANGE IN ATTITUDES CONCERNING TIME
The time a debtor lingers in bankruptcy matters. Lawyers charge by the hour,
investment bankers charge by the month and assorted other professionals also
charge by time, not by event. So, longer bankruptcies mean larger bills.32 But that
is not the principal cost of lingering. The principal cost for the secured creditor-
and for every other person that will receive a payment at the conclusion of the
case-is the lost opportunity to put that payment to use. Outside of bankruptcy a
secured creditor can foreclose, turn the collateral into cash and invest that cash.
Inside bankruptcy and, absent a bargain of the kind described in Part VI, interest
payments for pre-petition debt are suspended in almost all cases; consequently the
creditor's bargained benefit is lost.
For some, prolonging bankruptcy is good. Of course, lawyers and others who
charge by unit of time have an interest in prolonging the case; the same is true of
employees of the debtor. Where liquidation will leave nothing for the shareholders,
or, in more desperate cases, even for the unsecured creditors, they too lose nothing
and may gain by prolonging. The shareholders-and less likely the unsecureds-
share Mr. Micawber's hope that "something will turn up," the hope that the market
for the debtor's product will turn, that the recession will end, or that the debtor's
competitors will stumble. In most cases these hopes are as vain as Mr. Micawber's
were. By hypothesis in these cases the debtor's trajectory is downward; those who
have put the firm into this precarious position are usually still in the cockpit and the
bankruptcy itself is increasing the dive angle. Still this hope of future payment,
however unrealistic, is preferable to the present certainty of no recovery that
liquidation brings.
This is the conflict that the Code and the courts must resolve. The shareholders,
employees and perhaps the unsecureds want the bankruptcy prolonged in the hope
that they can capture some latent upside and the secureds want liquidation so they
can cash out and move on. In life the arguments will not be as honest and crude as I
32 See Joseph Mitzel, When is an Order Final?: A Result-Oriented Approach to the Finality Requirement
for Bankruptcy Appeals to Federal Circuit Courts, 74 MrNN. L. REv. 1337, 1367 ("[T]he accumulation of
legal fees during a corporate reorganization can make long delays extremely expensive for both the debtor
and the unsecured creditors."); Edward A. Adams, Studies:Billing Rates Higher, Proceedings Take Longer
Here, N.Y.L.J., June 24, 1993, at I ("The more time a company spends in bankruptcy, the higher the fees
will be."). It is estimated that Enron's legal fees will top $1 billion. This would make it the most expensive
bankruptcy ever; however, it is likely that it will be topped by WorldCom. See Eric Berger, Legal Fees for




have suggested. Those out of the money will not ask for extensions by expressing
hope that something will turn up, rather they will argue that the value of the
company is large enough to leave something for them. They will argue about the
going concern value of the debtor and will scold the secureds for their selfish wish
to destroy that value. The employees, fully aligned with shareholders for this
purpose, need only stand in the wings with tears in their eyes to make their interest
known. The lawyers and others with an interest in prolonging may covertly delay
court proceedings but they dare not voice their private interests.
These conflicts between the secureds on the one hand and shareholders, et al.
on the other, can be joined in several ways. The most obvious is over the debtor's
request for an extension of the exclusivity period, the period within which only the
debtor can propose a plan of reorganization. The period is 120 days 33 and the court
has the power to extend it repeatedly.34 The conflict might also be fought out over a
secured's request for the stay to be lifted or for adequate protection.
In the large cases that followed on the heels of the Code, judges often spoke and
acted as though the purpose of chapter 1 1 were to produce reorganizations and
avoid liquidations at all costs. This attitude led to multiple extensions of the
exclusivity period in early cases.
But then two things challenged conventional judicial attitudes. First there was a
burst of academic writing. Professor Michelle White and others demonstrated the
evils of prolonging the life of a dying firm. This writing demonstrated that
prolonging bankruptcy could hurt not only secured creditors but also unsecured
creditors and competing firms. And this cost was not offset by significant rewards
for employees. For example Eastern Airlines flew for two years in bankruptcy.
When it liquidated, its secured creditors were not paid in full, its unsecureds went
hungry, and its employees lost their jobs. To the extent that its continued operation
was subsidized by the bankruptcy process (no interest payments for 22 months), 35 it
injured its competitors who had to pay their interest bills.
36
Professor White lists a number of "subsidies" that are given to reorganizing
firms in bankruptcy, 37 such as an interest-free bankruptcy reorganization period, and
the right selectively to cancel unprofitable projects.38 White followed these writings
33 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2002) (providing "only the debtor may file a plan until after 120 days after the
date of the order for relief under this chapter.").
34 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (2002) (allowing for extension, or reduction, of 120 day period on request of
party in interest).
3 See Lawrence A. Weiss & Karen H. Wruck, Information Problems, Conflicts of Interest, and Asset
Stripping: Chapter 11's Failure in the Case of Eastern Airlines, 48 J. FN. ECON. 55, 56 (1998) (stating
bankruptcy court allowed Eastern to use proceeds of asset sales to fund continued operations for 22 months).
36 Economic arguments were made that the bankruptcy process allowed inefficient firms to continue
operating, while more efficient firms would file for bankruptcy to redistribute debt loads. See Michelle J.
White, The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 129, 129-30 (1989).
37 See id. at 144-46 (listing subsidies reorganizing firms benefit from including: accrued tax loss
carryforwards, right to terminate underfunded pension plans, non-recognition of debt forgiveness for tax
puroses, etc.).
3 See id. at 143-45 (noting interest-free reorganization period granted to debtors and ability of debtor to
get out of unprofitable contracts during reorganization).
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a few years later by showing that both efficient and inefficient firms were likely to
file for bankruptcy, and suggested that the process needed to be reformed to
improve efficiency in chapter 11.39
Also the courts began to take hits in the popular press. A 1993 Wall Street
Journal article criticized courts for turning bankruptcies into "marathons." The
article suggested that preserving dying companies did little to benefit the industry
but forced competitors to suffer by having to compete with debt-reduced, re-
organized dogs-often in crowded markets.40 Some bankruptcy practitioners even
joined in these complaints.
41
A third event may have played a role here too. By the late '80's professional
DIP lenders had evolved and those lenders and their lawyers had figured out that
some courts were more favorable to their interests than others. As I explain more
fully below, these DIP lenders directed their debtor clients to courts that would be
more receptive to a creditor's request to lift the stay or to present a competing plan.
Also, as I show below, the DIP lenders learned to take a stronger grip on the debtor
than they had done previously. This may have had a direct impact on the length of
cases even if the judges had not changed.
The upshot of this is shown by the charts in the footnotes.42 Note that the
average length of large bankruptcies of 1007 days in 1980 has shrunk to 402 days
39 See generally Michelle J. White, Does Chapter II Save Economically Inefficient Firms?, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1319 (1994).
40 See Kenneth H. Bacon, Creditor Backlash: Losses in Bankruptcies Spur Lenders to Strive to Protect
Themselves- Impetus to Stiffen Law Grows as More People use it Simply as Business Tactic- The 'Survival
of the Unfittest', WALL ST. J., June 17, 1993, at Al (using Bethlehem Steel as example of company suffering
due to competition with reorganized competitors that reduced their debt and evaded obligations).
41 See Cieri, supra note 22, at 419-20 (asserting chapter 11 cases are taking too long, and overuse of
exclusivity provisions is partly to blame).
42
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198 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Controlling for
All Bankruptcies "Pre-packaged" and "Pre-negotiated"
Year Mean Frequency Mean Frequency
1980 1007 3 1007 3
1981 1403 5 1403 5
1982 1084 13 1084 13
1983 827 6 827 6
1984 823 6 823 6
1985 1087 6 1087 6
1986 970 10 1067 9
1987 636 8 636 8
1988 730 12 730 12
1989 990 15 1040 14
1990 747 27 792 25
1991 670 38 738 34
1992 356 31 513 20
1993 315 25 512 14
1994 431 11 720 6
1995 639 18 798 14
1996 385 14 705 6
1997 472 14 673 9
1998 412 29 543 20
1999 417 35 549 21
2000 402 57 469. 43
2001 306 57 348 40
2002 110 36 112 13
f-,,,,
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by 2000. Even when one controls for pre-packaged and pre-negotiated
bankruptcies, the average length in days has fallen from 1007 in 1980 to 469 in
2000. The length of time has also dropped even if one excludes the cases that were
filed away from the debtor's home (i.e., in a forum presumably favorable to the
debtor); the average length of cases filed in the place of the debtor's headquarters
has fallen from 926 in 1980 to 423 in 2000.
II. SECURITY SUBSTITUTES-SECURITIZATION AND LEASES
A. Securitization
A principal limitation on the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction is the definition of
"Property of the Estate" in section 541. In general if something is property of the
estate, the court and the DIP have power to mess with it; if not, they don't. If a
lender can somehow transfer its collateral to a third party, such as a trust or a
"special purpose vehicle," the property will be beyond the reach of the DIP and of
the court in any bankruptcy of the debtor. This means that the creditor will not be
subject to the stay with respect to the collateral, the DIP will not be able to use or
sell it under section 363 as it could if the collateral were inventory or equipment
subject to a security interest, and it means that interest (or the economic substitute
for interest) continues to be paid. Finally of course this property and any claims to
it are unaffected by any plan of reorganization.
An ancient practice called "factoring" fits this model. A "factor" is one who
buys a seller's accounts receivable for a discount and without recourse. The factor
thus buys the entire upside (if the accounts pay more than his discounted price, he
gains) and bears the risk of default by the account debtors (if many default, he bears
that loss). Factoring is the economic equivalent of a secured, non-recourse loan
under which the creditor has agreed to look to the accounts as its sole recovery.
Beginning in 1948, 43 factoring graduated to the big leagues where it was given a
new name, "securitization." Securitization first developed in the home mortgage
The charts above show the general trend of duration in days for large chapter I I cases, using data
compiled by Professor Lynn LoPucki. They show a general downward trend, though the number of cases in
the first two years are statistically insignificant, at 3 and 5 respectively. Pre-packaged and pre-negotiated
bankruptcies may have played a role, but the data suggests that it is a limited role. Controlling for "pre-
packaged" and "pre-negotiated" bankruptcies, the mean duration in the first statistically significant year,
1982, was at 1084 days; that number had fallen to 348 days in 2001, and had shown a similar downward
trend. "Pre-packaged" means that the debtor drafted the plan and successfully solicited votes on it before
filing the case. Pre-packaged cases nearly always are filed solely to modify the company's liability on an
issue of junk bonds. Once filed, these cases move very quickly. "Pre-negotiated" means that the debtor
negotiated the terms of the plan with some, but not all creditor groups before filing, even if no prefiling vote
was taken on the plan. An example would be a plan to sell the debtor's business, which has been drafted and
negotiated with a large secured creditor before filing, but not with trade creditors. See WebBRD: Lynn M.
Lo~ucki's Bankruptcy Research Database, at http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/index.htm.
See TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSETS POOLS, AND
ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES § 6.2, at 180 (Little, Brown & Co. 1991) ("In 1948, Congress chartered the
Federal National Mortgage Administration ("FNMA" or "Fannie Mae"), which had been established as a
2004]
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market. In that market Fannie Mae struck upon the idea of bundling packages of
mortgage loans, putting them in a trust or other entity and then selling interests in
the pool of mortgages. This transaction gave Fannie Mae cash for its mortgages so
enabling it to make new mortgage loans. Separating the loans from Fannie Mae
meant that the pool of mortgages carried a credit rating unrelated to Fannie Mae's
business and freed the investors from any need to monitor Fannie Mae or to
determine its creditworthiness. It seems unlikely that fear of bankruptcy of the
lenders, Fannie Mae, et al., stimulated those early securitizations (for the Freddies',
Fannies', and Ginnies' liabilities are thought to carry the implicit guarantee of the
federal government) but moving them off the balance sheet of Fannie Mae, et al.
simplified the credit evaluation.
Soon securitization spread to other markets where bankruptcy of the original
lender was conceivable. Beginning in 1985, 44 consumer lenders, weak and strong,
and many others started securitizing. In some of these cases bankruptcy of the
original lender, no longer Ginnie or Freddie protected by the government's wing,
was a possibility. When so, investors would be willing to pay to be free of that risk.
Therefore in those cases, the seller of the accounts would enjoy a lower effective
interest rate (a smaller discount) than they would have to pay on a conventional
direct secured loan against the same accounts. Professor Lupica describes this
growth of securitization as follows:
[C]lever investment bankers realized in the mid-1980s that the same financial
innovation could be applied to non-real estate related receivables. Once discovered,
the securitization market grew quickly, and currently, it is the fastest growing
segment of the capital markets. More than 2.5 trillion of asset-backed securities are
outstanding, and over the past fifteen years, the market has grown at a rate of thirty
subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1938, to develop a secondary market in mortgage
loans.") (citations omitted); see also Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1119-21 (1996):
The modem era of securitization began in 1970 when the United States
government created the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac").
Freddie Mac joined its siblings, Government National Mortgage Association ("Ginnie
Mae") and Federal National Mortgage Administration ("Fannie Mae"; all three
collectively, "GSEs" or "government sponsored entities") in making a secondary
market in mortgages-that is, buying and selling mortgages. Fannie Mae and Ginnie
Mae had bought and sold mortgages and mortgage backed securities guaranteed by the
Veterans Administration ("VA") and the Federal Housing Administration ("FHA"). By
contrast Freddie Mac's secondary market activities involved 'conventional' mortgages..
Id. (citations omitted).
" See FRANKEL, supra note 43, at 183 ("By 1980 the success of the secondary mortgage market was
established, and private sector lenders, mortgage bankers, and the securities industry sought to enter this
market."); see also Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the Bankruptcy
Dynamic, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 287, 291-92 n.29 (2001) [hereinafter Revised Article 9] ("Sperry
Corporation originated the first non-real estate-related public securitization in 1985. This issuance was
followed by General Motors Acceptance Corporation securitization in 1986." (noted in Lowell L. Bryan,
Structured Securitized Credit; A Superior Technology for Lending, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 1988, at 10-
11)).
[Vol. 12: 139
DEATH & RESURRECTION OF SECURED CREDIT
percent per year. Industry experts hav& observed that virtually any asset income
stream can be securitized, and recent years have seen a volume of $150 billion in
issuances. An estimated $700 million in public asset-backed securities are now
issued in an average business day.4 5
It is indisputable that for many debtors securitization is a cheaper way of
acquiring capital than secured borrowing is. What part of that savings is
attributable to avoidance of the trustee's reach in bankruptcy is not clear, but surely
some part of the savings comes from bankruptcy "remoteness." Whether the
process is efficient, whether, as Prof Schwarcz argues, it is truly an alchemy, is also
subject to dispute.4 6 Despite all the arguments that one sees about freedom from the
debtors' "exposure to external events, business downturns, interest rate fluctuations,
[and] management decisions, '47 it seems plausible to me that avoidance of the
debtor's trustee is the only virtue in many cases. Apart from the bankruptcy risk, I
see no reason why a fully secured creditor should charge a higher interest rate than
a securitization investor would demand.4 8 Absent bankruptcy, full security protects
from bad business decisions, external events, claims of other creditors of the
debtor's business, etc.
Let me explain the "bankruptcy risk." Compare a secured creditor who lends
$10 million and takes a security interest in debtor's $12 million of receivables with
a group of investors who buys notes from a trust that holds the debtor's $12 million
worth of receivables. Experience tells us that the investors will demand a lower
effective interest rate than the bank will charge. °
45 Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory Institutionalization of
Securitization, 33 CoNN. L. REv. 199, 208-09 (2000) [hereinafter Circumvention of Bankruptcy Process].
46 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FiN. 133,
146-51 (1994) [hereinafter Alchemy of Asset Securitization]. But see Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization:
The Unsecured Creditor's Perspective, 76 TEX. L. REv. 595, 659 (1998):
The most modest conclusion that may be drawn is that structured finance's
efficiency is unproven. A bolder assertion, and one this Article predicts will be
supported by empirical evidence, is that securitization is inefficient. When value is
diverted from nonadjusting creditors to parties with greater knowledge, resources, and
opportunity to bargain ex ante for greater leverage to encourage voluntary repayment
(and in the event of bankruptcy, to guarantee priority repayment), then this value
represents a. distributional inefficiency. Moreover, unsecured creditors of securitizing
originators do not receive the benefits of protection from the phenomenon of debtor
misbehavior that they receive when their debtor uses its assets as security for credit. In
the absence of such protections, unsecured creditors are most vulnerable to the risk of
nonpayment as well as the risk of debtor's bankruptcy.
Id. (citations omitted); Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1051,
1054 (1984) (defending, from recent scholarly attack, his thesis declaring secured lending inefficient).
Schwartz believes secured credit is inefficient because it is costly to issue, and the benefit of the lower
interest rate from the secured lender, for their decreased risk, will be completely offset by the increased
interest rates unsecured lenders will charge for their increased risk of being unable to levy against assets. Id.
47 Circumvention of Bankruptcy Process, supra note 45, at 211.
48 Of course a secured lender's cost of funds might be higher than the cost of funds of mutual funds and
others who buy securitized assets as investors. If so, one would expect securitized loans to be cheaper than
secured loans, irrespective of bankruptcy. See Claire A. Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient?, 80 TEx. L. REV.
1117, 1130 (2002) (discussing differences between lenders and markets concerning secured debt).
2004]
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It is indisputable that the debtor's interest in the receivables in which it has
given a security interest is part of the bankruptcy estate under section 541.49 Even
though the debtor has given a perfected security interest, the debtor retains title. In
the second case most commentators and virtually every practitioner of securitization
believe that the "sale" of the receivables to the trust has removed them from the
bankruptcy estate as that estate is defined in section 541.50
49 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2002) (including "all legal or equitable interest of the debtor in property as of
commencement of the case.").
50 See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET
SECURITIZATION 16-24 (Practicing Law Inst., 2d ed. 1992) (discussing important aspect of transactions and
extensive efforts of originators when SPVs are structured so courts will characterize transactions as true
sales, and not loans, so SPV will not become part of bankruptcy estate of originator, should originator fail);
Alchemy of Asset Securitization, supra note 46, at 151 ("Securitization, thus, creates genuine cost reductions.
By eliminating the risk of bankruptcy to investors, many different types of companies can better utilize their
most valuable assets, their receivables, by accessing low cost capital market funding."); see also U.C.C. § 9-
318 (2002) (covering the rights and title of sellers of accounts or chattle paper with respect to creditors and
purchasers); PEB COMMENTARY NO. 14, § 9-102(1)(b) (June 10, 1994) (proposing addition to comment 2
to 9-102, which denied any intention to leave any interest with seller of accounts despite using terms
"debtor" and "secured party"). The Commentary declares, "a close reading of the text of Article 9 and its
comments ... compels the conclusion that Article 9 does not prevent the transfer of ownership." Id. This
comment was issued in response to Octagon Gas v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993), where the court
held that a perfected sale of a 5% interest in the proceeds of a gas distribution system were part of the
bankrupt's estate, because Article 9 treats the buyer of an account as a secured creditor, the seller as debtor
and the accounts sold as collateral. Id.; Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful was the
Revision of UCC Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 74 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1357, 1398 n.178 (1999)
("Revised section 9-318 rejects Octagon Gas insofar as the opinion interpreted Article 9."). But see In re
LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 279 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (involving LTV, "one of the largest
manufacturers of wholly-integrated steel products in the United States," entered into unconventional
securitizations of its receivables and inventory). Having filed for bankruptcy, the debtor sought an interim
order to permit the use of cash collateral arguing that the pre-petition financing arrangements were not "true
sales." Id. at 281. The court granted the motion until the determination of whether the transactions were "true
sales" could be made, over the objections of the owners of the assets who claimed the court had no basis to
determine whether the assets were part of the debtor's estate. Id. at 282. Judge Bodoh responded to these
objections:
[T]here seems to be an element of sophistry to suggest that Debtor does retain at least
an equitable interest in the property that is subject to the interim order. Debtor's
business requires it to purchase, melt, mold and cast various metal products. To suggest
that Debtor lacks some ownership interest in products that it creates with its own labor,
as well as the proceeds to be derived from that labor, is difficult to accept. Accordingly,
the Court concludes that Debtor has at least some equitable interest in the inventory and
receivables, and that this interest is property of the Debtor's estate.
Id. at 285. The issue as to whether the transactions were true sales or not was never fully litigated, the court
approved DIP financing which was conditioned on debtors concession that the transactions were "true sales."
Id. at 284. See generally Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron, Asset Securitization and Bankruptcy Reform.- Dead or
Dormant?, II J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 101, 109 (2002) (discussing section 912 of Bankruptcy Reform Act of
2001, which would have protected securitization by prohibiting courts from treating securitizations as
secured transactions). Support for section 912 was undercut by the collapse of Enron, but Professor Lipson
predicts that similar provisions will be introduced in the future due to the "powerful, wealthy, and articulate
lobby" for the reform. Id.; Revised Article 9, supra note 44, at 292-93:
The long-term attractiveness of the ABS vehicle to investors, however, turns upon
the extent of the isolation of these assets from the credit risk of the originator. The
extent of the secured assets' isolation from the originator in turn, depends upon the
efficacy of the transaction's structure. The strength of any. transaction's structure is a
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When the debtor enters bankruptcy, the trustee or DIP has rights over the
receivables in the former but not the latter case. The most threatening of those
rights is the right to use property of the estate under section 363. For example the
DIP might propose to take one month's payments from the receivables to pay for
operating expenses and offer to give the bank a mortgage on its unmortgaged plant
as adequate protection. As I suggest above, the bank might find this collateral not
adequate because it is illiquid or because it believes that the value of the plant is
much less than the value of the receivables. Because the securitized receivables are
sold, and not within the estate, the DIP has no such power over them.
At this writing it is not absolutely clear that the law will continue to treat these
two transactions differently. Some argue that the sale to the trust or special purpose
vehicle is no more than the grant of a security interest and therefore that the sold
account is still within the estate. 5'
In section 541 the drafters of the Code were generally content to follow the
state law on ownership in defining property of the bankruptcy estate.5 2 With few
exceptions that was "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property" as
defined by the applicable state law. There is no indication that the Commission or
the legislative drafters foresaw the rise of securitization; in any case there was no
attempt to deal with it in section 541.
Had the drafters of the Code looked for state law on the nature of a securitizer's
rights in property they would have found it in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
product of a targeted and well developed legal system .... Seeing that the legal regime
governing securitization has been outpaced by the growth of the securitization market,
legal protection against the credit risk of the originator, used as a selling point to the
ABS investors, may in fact, be 'oversold'.
Id. (citations omitted). Lupica then describes the increased protection securitizations received in the 1999
amendments of article 9, but notes, "Section 9-318, however, does not address the equitable determination of
whether a particular asset transfer is properly characterized as a sale of assets or a transfer of collateral in
connection with a loan (the sale versus loan dilemma)." Id. at 301. (citations omitted). Greg Zipes,
Securitization: Challenges in the Age of LTV Steel Company, Inc., 2002 ANN. SURv. BANKR. L. 105, 111-
13 (2002) (noting securitizations are susceptible to grasp of trustee in bankruptcy through true sale analysis,
as in LTV, or through substantive consolidation law). Substantive consolidation is when a court determines
that equity requires the debtor and subsidiary be dealt with as one, usually because the affairs of the two
were heavily intertwined. Id. at 115.
51 See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. at 285 (highlighting Abbey National's arguments on whether
receivables are property of debtor's estate).
52 See H.R. DOC. No. 93-137, at 192-93:
The commission recommends that all property owned by the debtor as of the date of the
filing of the petition be considered property of the estate subject to administration ....
In addition to property owned by the debtor at the date of the petition, the property of
the estate would include (a) recoveries under the avoidance sections of the proposed
act; (b) property subject to a power of appointment to the extent exercisable by the
debtor for his own benefit; and (c) property acquired within six months of the petition
by bequest, devise, or inheritance or as a result of a property settlement or interlocutory
or final divorce decree. In the case of a partnership debtor, property of the estate would





Code (UCC). Earlier the drafters of Article 9 in turn could have taken either of two
positions on the rights of a factor/securitizer. First they might have treated'a
factor/securitizer as a secured creditor for all purposes. They might have
disregarded the form and simply ruled as a matter of state law that title to a "sold"
account was not sold but remained the property of the seller and that the
factor/securitizer held only a security interest that could be perfected by filing.
Alternatively the drafters could have recognized the "sale" as valid but ruled
that the "buyer" had to file a financing statement or be subordinated to the rights of
the seller's creditors.
By specifically referring to "sale of accounts" in section 9-102(1)(b) and by
treating the buyer's interest as a security interest in 1-201(37) and subordinating
unperfected security interests to the rights of lien creditors in 9-301, the drafters
apparently chose the latter alternative. That alternative was less radical than a
complete statutory reconfiguration of the transaction. So the law as adopted did not
say that a "sale of an account" was merely the "grant of a security interest" for all
purposes, rather by applying Article 9 to certain "sales," it appeared to recognize
those transactions as sales for certain undisclosed purposes but to require that the
buyer perfect if he wishes to enjoy priority over certain creditors of the seller.
If the drafters of the Code had foreseen this issue and had examined the
probable rights of a trustee in bankruptcy to the use of proceeds of sold accounts
under Article 9 (which in 1973 was already widely adopted) they might not have
been content to rely solely on state law. Despite periodic eruptions of dissent, it
seems likely that most courts will now follow the lead of the PEB53 and the revisers
of Article 954 to conclude that securitized accounts are outside of the seller's
bankruptcy estate and so removed from the DIP's reach. The uncertainty as to
whether securitized assets were to be out of the reach of a trustee in bankruptcy was
to be resolved once and for all in section 912 of the 2001 Bankruptcy Reform Act,
but the collapse of Enron undercut the proposal's support.55
53 See PEB COMMENTARY, supra note 50 (concluding "Article 9's application to sales of receivables does
not prevent the transfer of ownership" and amending U.C.C. section 9-102, comment 2 accordingly).
" See U.C.C. § 9-318 (2002). No interest retained in right to payment that is sold; rights and title of seller
of account or chattel paper with respect to creditors and purchasers:
(a) A debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or
promissory note does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the collateral sold.
(b) For purposed of determining the rights of creditors of, and purchasers for value of
an account or chattel paper from, a debtor that has sold an account or chattel
paper, while the buyer's security interest is unperfected, the debtor is deemed to
have rights and title to the account or chattel paper identical to those the debtor
sold.
Id.
55 See, e.g., Lipson, supra note 50, at 102, 102, 115-16 (claiming while "the connection between Enron
and Section 912 .. is only circumstantial" the legal uncertainty makes it "easy to see why Congress appears
to have jettisoned Section 912.').
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The magnitude of securitization-new public and private issue volume in the
ABS market set a record in 2002 of $420 billion 56-makes this process the most
significant anti-bankruptcy device for secured creditors. The dollar amount of
receivables that are securitized must swamp the dollar amount in which secured
creditors take conventional security interests. It seems unlikely that securitization
can be stretched to be a substitute for security in inventory but the creditors tried to
do so in LTV Steel5 7 and it is conceivable that others will succeed. Judge Bodoh
was particularly offended that the creditors in LTV thought that they could convey
the inventory of raw steel to a third party (who was to hold it ready for production),
make finished products of the steel on the day before LTV filed and yet claim that
the steel was not part of LTV's estate.58 Were effective securitizations of inventory
possible, Article 9 would become obsolete for large firms.
B. Leases
Leases and deals that are documented as leases but are in fact secured loans are
well known. Here I ignore the kinds of leases--often with inexpensive purchase
options-that are treated as security agreements under section 1-201(37) of the
UCC. I consider only deals that would be regarded as true leases, not subject to
Article 9 but rather to Article 2A.
Even though this latter group is classified as leases and not as security
agreements, they can be a secured lending substitute. For example a trucking
company might lease a new truck for ten years. If these leases had no option to
buy, they would not be treated as a security agreement under section 1-201(37) but
would enable the trucking company to have assured long-term use of the asset in
return for installment payments. Economically, if not legally, such a lease is a
substitute for a loan secured by the asset.59
The rights of lessors, covered in exquisite detail in section 365, differ widely
from the rights of a secured creditor in bankruptcy. First the debtor must either
assume the lease or reject it within a reasonable period after the filling. To assume
56 U.S. Market Outlook, RESEARCH (The Bond Mkt. Research Ass'n, Wash. D.C.), Jan. 2003, at 2,
available at http://www.bondmarkets.com/research/USMarketOutloook for_2003.pdf (last visited Mar.
24, 2004).
57 In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 285 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (rejecting creditor's argument that
"receivables which constitute its collateral are not property of Debtor's estate" as circular and containing
"element of sophistry").
58 I am informed that one law firm gave an opinion that the sale of receivables by LTV was ok but that it
did not give the opinion on the inventory. The latter opinion came from another firm. My informant
suggested that the firm that gave the receivable letter declined to give a similar opinion on the inventory.
S Lessors have always had the right to repossess aircraft under section 1110. See 11 U.S.C. § 11 0(a)(1)
(Supp. 2003) (detailing ability of both secured creditors and lessors to repossess aircraft with few
limitations); see also Gregory P. Ripple, Special Protection in the Air[line industry]: The Historical
Development of Section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code, 78 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 281, 283, 294 (2002)
(noting section 1110 "provides an exception to the automatic stay, and allows the financiers of aircraft[s ...
to repossess their collateral if the airline is unable to cure any defaults within thirty days" and that "[a]ny
lease or security interest in aircraft now falls under the umbrella of section 1110.").
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a lease, the DIP must bring the lease payments up to date or give adequate
assurance (not to be confused with the weaker adequate protection) that he will
promptly do so. After he affirms, the DIP must pay according to the lease terms.
Failure to pay on a lease that the lessee has assumed would be a basis for lessor's
cancellation, 60 and amounts not paid after an assumption earn administrative
expense priority. 61 Most important, the debtor has no right to tender mere adequate
protection nor does he have the right in reorganization to keep the asset on payment
of an amount equal to its value. In short the cramdown under section 1129 that may
be forced on every secured creditor (making it settle its secured claim for the value
of the collateral) cannot be imposed on a lessor.
Leases are not perfect or pervasive substitutes for security. They are not
suitable for inventory and they carry a debtor's option to cancel. Under section 365
a debtor who chooses not to assume may reject a lease, return the asset to the lessor
and suffer only an unsecured claim equal to the damage caused to the lessor by the
rejection.62
This means that leases are preferable to security agreements for certain only
where the leased goods will retain value to the debtor/lessee that is greater than the
present cost of the lease payments. Consider a hypothetical airline that leases both
777's and 727's. The former are new large two engine aircraft with low operating
costs per seat/mile; the latter are smaller, older three engine gas pigs. When the
airline declares bankruptcy, it will want to keep the 777's and get rid of the 727's,
and the market will share the debtor's opinion-777's resale market will be high and
the 727's, low. In a proposed renegotiation of the 777 leases, the lessor will have
63the upper hand; in a renegotiation of the 727 leases, vice versa.
60 Cf 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1110.05, at 2[b] (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 2001):
[I]f the trustee formally assumes the relevant lease or executory contract, either
pursuant to a plan or in accordance with the provisions of section 365, then the
obligation becomes a binding obligation of the estate. After assumption, breach of the
relevant obligation will give rise to a damage claim allowable as an administrative
expense (if the breach occurs before confirmation of a plan) or recoverable against the
reorganized debtor (if the breach occurs after confirmation).
Id.
61 See, e.g., Laura B. Bartell, The Lease of Money in Bankruptcy: Time for Consistency?, 16 BANKR. DEV.
J. 267, 275 n.34 (2000) ("If the rejected lease had been previously assumed, the breach is deemed to occur at
the time of rejection . . . meaning that the damages occasioned by the breach will be entitled to
administrative expense priority.") (footnotes omitted).
62 See Bartell, supra note 61, at 274-75:
When neither assumption nor assumption and assignment are beneficial to the
estate, the trustee may opt to reject the unexpired lease .... Some consequences of
rejection are clear: section 365(g)(1) provides that such rejection of an unexpired lease
which has not previously been assumed constitutes a 'breach' of the lease immediately
before the date of the filing of the petition. The claim arising from such a breach is
treated as is any other claim arising prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition; that is,
it is considered a pre-petition claim subject to discharge.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
63 See Edward Wong, The Silver Lining in United's Clouds: Good Lease Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
2002, at C l:
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So in some cases leases side-step many of the barriers that chapter 11 places in
front of secured creditors. If the asset is suitable for lease, and if there is a
reasonable likelihood that the asset will retain sufficient value to make a
reorganizing lessee assume the lease, the lease is likely to preserve the lessor's
analog to interest, likely to avoid issues of unsatisfactory adequate protection and,
under the terms of section 365, be impervious to any other tricks of the DIP.
III. SECTION 363 SALES
Chapter 11 was designed for reorganization. I suspect that many of the drafters
had visions of railroad reorganizations before them as they sat down to work every
day. In drafting sections 1129, 1121 and like sections, they must have visualized
extended negotiation among creditors of various ranks, shareholders and employees
as the parties untangled a complicated capital structure.
Did they anticipate that section 363, used commonly for ordinary course sales
(and even for an occasional sale of an asset out of the ordinary course), could also
be used to sell off the principal business, the going concern guts of the firm that
entered chapter 11? Of course, such a sale of the principal operating unit short
circuits extended palaver over the various parties' rights in a plan; there is no vote
on a plan or opportunity to litigate over rights under section 1129. If the assets sold
are subject to a perfected security interest, the sale cuts off the possibility that the
unsecureds or shareholders will profit from a later increase in the value of those
assets or from a finding by the bankruptcy court that the assets have greater value
than the price to be received on their sale. The sale also ends the jobs of employees
who are not carried away with the sold operations. So one might expect that
shareholders and employees who are to lose jobs always and unsecured creditors,
sometimes, would oppose such sales and would argue that they are a perversion of
chapter I Is purpose.
United, the world's second-largest airline, after American, leases nearly 40 percent
of its 633 planes, according to Back Aviation Solutions, an airline consulting company.
So renegotiating better lease rates - as well as rejecting leases outright on the least
useful aircraft - would mean tremendous cost savings ....
Russell Young, a spokesman for Boeing Capital, which has $1.3 billion of
exposure to United through aircraft loans, leases and bonds, said that the street value of
planes had fallen 15 to 40 percent since the Sept. 11 attacks, and that United would be
using the new values as benchmarks in its talks.
United can bargain hard to get better rates on its older or out-of-production
aircraft, experts say. The airline could tell its lessors it will terminate leases on, say, all
its Boeing 757's and sign new leasing agreements on only the first dozen handed it on
generous conditions. But that tactic might not work well with United's younger Airbus
fleet. The airline's 153 Airbus A320's are only four years old on average, and it is
unlikely United would want to lose those planes. Furthermore it would be tougher to
bargain for a basement rate on the A320's since they are thought to be a hot commodity,
especially because of their popularity among growing low-cost carriers. Those planes
could be more easily redeployed by lessors if they were to take them back from United.
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In Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways,
Inc.), 64 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit struck down the proposed transfer
to PSA of Braniff s cash, terminal leases, landing slots, airplanes, and equipment for
65travel scrip, unsecured notes, and profit participation in PSA's proposed operation.
The objection was that section 363(b) is not applicable to sales of all, or
substantially all of the assets of a debtor, and that these transactions must be made
pursuant to the "voting, disclosure and confirmation requirements" of the Code.
The court viewed the transaction as a whole, as the lower courts had, and concluded
that since certain portions of the transaction were outside the scope of section 363,
the transaction could not be approved.66 The court held, "In any future attempts to
specify the terms whereby a reorganization plan is to be adopted, the parties and the
district court must scale the hurdle erected by Chapter 11.,67
But Braniff s reign was short. In another 1983 opinion, In re The Lionel
Corp.,68 the Second Circuit disapproved of a section 363 sale of the principal asset
of the company prior to confirmation. The Court held, "there must be some
articulated business justification, other than appeasement of major creditors, for
using, selling, or leasing property outside the normal course of business before the
bankruptcy judge may order such disposition under 363(b)." Even though the
quoted statement was dictum, it directed later courts toward "business reasons" to
justify a sale and away from the case law that required an "emergency" for a sale
outside the ordinary course of business. 69 Later cases took up the cause and soon
'4 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983).
65 Id.
66 See id. at 939-40 (discussing aspects of proposed sale outside scope of section 363):
Three examples will illustrate our rationale. The PSA Agreement provided that
Braniff would pay $2.5 million to PSA in exchange for $7.5 million of scrip entitling
the holder to travel on PSA. It further required that the scrip be used only in a future
Braniff reorganization and that it be issued only to former Braniff employees or
shareholders or, in a limited amount, to unsecured creditors. This provision not only
changed the composition of Braniffs assets . . . it also had the practical effect of
dictating some of the terms of any future reorganization plan ....
Second, under the agreement between Braniff and its creditors, the secured
creditors were required to vote a portion of their deficiency claim in favor of any future
reorganization plan approved by a majority of the unsecured creditors committee....
Third, the PSA transaction also provided for the release of claims by all parties
against Braniff, its secured creditors and it officers and directors.
Id.
67 Id. at 940.
68 In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir.1983).69 See id. at 1070-71:
The history surrounding the enactment in 1978 of current Chapter 11 and the logic
underlying it buttress our conclusion that there must be some articulate business
justification . . . for using, selling, or leasing property out of the ordinary course of
business ....
The case law under section 363's statutory predecessors used terms like
"perishables," "deteriorating," and "emergency" as guides in deciding whether a
debtor's property could be sold outside the ordinary course of business. The use of such
words persisted long after their omission from newer statutes and rules. The
administrative power to sell or lease property in a reorganization continued to be the
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even "appeasement of major creditors," marching under the banner of business
justification, was enough."v
In a modest bit of hyperbole Professors Baird. and Rasmussen were able to
claim in 2002 that 363 sales of businesses had nearly pushed conventional
reorganizations off the stage:
Corporate reorganizations have all but disappeared. Giant corporations make
headlines when they file for chapter 11, but they are no longer using it to rescue a
firm from imminent failure. Many use chapter 11 merely to sell their assets and
divide up the proceeds. TWA filed only to consummate the sale of its planes and
landing gates to American Airlines. Enron's principal assets, including its trading
operation and its most valuable pipelines, were sold within a few months of its
bankruptcy petition. Within weeks of filing for chapter 11, Budget sold most of its
assets to the parent company of Avis. Similarly, Polaroid entered chapter 11 and
sold most of its assets to the private equity group at Bank One. Even when a large
firm uses chapter 11 as something other than a convenient auction block, its
principal lenders are usually already in control and chapter 11 merely puts in place a
preexisting deal. Rarely is chapter 11 a forum where the various stakeholders in a
publicly held firm negotiate among each other over the firm's destiny.
71
Although he is more critical of the new attitude than Professors Baird and
Rasmussen, Professor Kuney's work confirms their claims about the prevalence of
business sales and shows that the practice and bankruptcy court rules have now
accommodated 363 business sales.72 His survey shows the extensive use of section
363 to liquidate assets in chapter 11.
73
exception, not the rule. In enacting the 1978 Code Congress was aware of existing case
law and clearly indicated as one of its purposes that equity interests have a greater
voice in reorganization plans -- hence, the safeguards of disclosure, voting, acceptance
and confirmation in present Chapter 11.
Resolving the apparent conflict between Chapter 11 and section 363(b) does not
require an all or nothing approach. Every sale under section 363(b) does not
automatically short-circuit or side-step Chapter 11 ... some play for the operation of
both section 363 (b) and Chapter 11 must be allowed for.
Id (citations omitted). But cf id. at 1071 ("The administrative power to sell or lease property in a
reorganization continued to be the exception, not the rule.").
70 Craig A. Sloane, The Sub Rosa Plan of Reorganization: Side-Stepping Creditor Protections in Chapter
11, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 37, 48 (1999) ("The Lionel 'business justification' test has become the preeminent
standard for applications to sell assets outside the ordinary course of business pursuant to section 363(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code.").
71 Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REv. 751, 751-52
(2002).
72 See George W. Kuney, Let's Make it Official:Adding an Explicit Preplan Sale Process as an Alternative
Exit From Bankruptcy, 40 HouS. L. REV. 1265 (2004) [hereinafter Alternative Exit From Bankruptcy]; see
also-George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 363(9 and Undermining the Chapter 11
Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L. J. 235, 272 (2002) [hereinafter Misinterpreting Bankruptcy] (indicating chapter
11 use to achieve pre-negotiated sale of business or assets flows from inclusion of claims under section
363(f)).
73 See Alternative Exit From Bankruptcy, supra note 72, at 1266-67 (providing number of proposed
amendments to Bankruptcy Code to provide for uniform, non-plan sale process nationwide).
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Professor Kuney advocates a uniform non-plan sale process because it would
standardize what courts are already doing. He describes the benefits of non-plan
sales as follows:
By selling the assets of a business as a unit, rather than in a piecemeal
liquidation, going concern value can be captured for the benefit of the estate.
Further, by reducing the assets of the estate to cash, a note secured by the assets
sold, the stock purchaser, or some other similar form of fungible valuable
consideration, the tasks and costs of post-sale management and administration of a
debtor and its estate can be dramatically reduced. This, in turn, allows for a
reduction in the amount of a debtor's value that is redistributed from pre-petition
creditors to post-petition administrative claimants as a case drags on. It takes little
in the way of a management team to preside over an estate comprised solely of
liquid assets. Further, once reduced to liquid assets, proposal and confirmation of a
strict or absolute priority plan or conversion of the case to one under chapter 7
should lead to speedy distributions to creditors and a minimum of haggling and
litigation over proper priorities.74
So what does this offer to the secured creditors? Well, it gives them the same
benefit that everyone else enjoys, a lower priced reorganization. Part of that comes
from reduced administrative fees, but more of it comes from the shortening of the
term of their non interest-bearing loan. Presumably the ultimate payout in these
cases comes sooner than in other chapter 1 Is and that payout can be put to use. But
as I indicate above, it also minimizes the possibility that the unsecureds or the
employees successfully bargain for a larger share of the assets as a payoff for
ending their delay and it minimizes the possibility that the court will give the
unsecureds too large a share because it overvalues the debtor's assets.
IV. USE OF STATUTORY PROTECTIONS
Notwithstanding any preference that the Commission or the Congress might
have had for facilitating reorganization and for protecting the rights of certain
unsecureds and debtors, both recognized the interests of secured creditors. The
Code includes many provisions to protect those interests, and a few provisions that
strengthen those interests have been added since 1978. Well-heeled and well
represented, secured creditors have made the most of these provisions in the 25
years since the Code's adoption. Among these are 1129(b)(2)(A), 364(d), 547(c),
507(b), 1110 and the post Code enactments on swaps, repo agreements and the like,
section 555 et seq.
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A. 1129(b) (2) (A)
The most prominent (but seldom tested) of the secured creditor protection
provisions is section 1129(b)(2)(A). That subsection protects against "cramdowns,"
the imposition of a plan over the objection of a secured creditor. It requires that an
unconsenting secured creditor get a stream of cash with a present value equal to the
value of its collateral or the indubitable equivalent of that stream.75 Cramdowns on
secured creditors may be often threatened, but they are seldom done. Why?
First few DIP lenders need cramdown protection. Any DIP lender with its wits
about it will be in the driver's seat for all of the reasons described in Part VI
below. 76 Having made itself indispensable by making the DIP loan, the DIP lender
will be intimately involved in the formulation of a plan, and any such plan of
reorganization will accommodate the lender's wishes.
Second the cost and difficulty of a fight with a major secured creditor may be
more than a reorganizing debtor can bear, even if a cramdown were likely at the end
of the fight. Some commentators believe that the uncertainties involved in the
bankruptcy process, specifically collateral valuation, the determination of the
discount rate, and the cost of delay, are the reasons few cramdowns are attempted.77
75 Each secured claim is usually in its own class because the claim is different from all other secured
claims in either: priority, nature of the collateral, or particular subordination agreements the lender may
have. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1122.01 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th rev. ed. 2001)
("Section 1122 of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs the classification of claims or interests in a chapter
11 plan, provides a plan proponent with an important tool in aid of reorganization-namely, the ability to
classify substantially similar claims in the same class for purposes of voting and treatment.") (footnotes
omitted); see also 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1122.03[4][c] (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1996)
("As a general rule, each holder of an allowed claim secured by a security interest in specific property of the
debtor should be placed in a separate class . . . . Conceptually, classification of secured claims must be
determined on the basis of (i) priority, (ii) nature of the collateral, and (iii) agreements among creditors with
respect to subordination.") (footnotes omitted).
7 See infra Part VI.
77 See Charles D. Booth, The Cramdown on Secured Creditors: An Impetus Toward Settlement, 60 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 69, 104-05 (1986) (highlighting risks of cramdown process: confusion, delay, valuation,
discount rates, and increased likelihood of liquidation due to adversarial posturing of parties). Booth then
concludes "All of these risks and uncertainties may be avoided if the parties avert a cramdown .... [I]n most
chapter 11 cases, it will be in the best interest of all the parties to reach a settlement and to consent to a plan
under section 1129(a), rather than to resort to a cramdown under section 1129(b)." See also Richard F.
Broude, Cramdown and Chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative, 39 Bus. LAW. 441,
454 (1984):
Valuation of the company is something that sophisticated participants in any
significant Chapter 11 avidly desire to avoid. The imposition of the fair and equitable
standard and a modified version of the absolute priority rule in [C]hapter I I is thus
designed to bring the parties to the bargaining table in an attempt to avoid the various
risks described throughout this article. By compromise and settlement, secured
creditors can avoid the risks inherent in collateral valuation and a court-imposed
interest discount rate ....
Id. But see Jack Friedman, What Courts Do To Secured Creditors in Chapter II Cramdown, 14 CARDOzO L.
REV. 1496, 1499 (1993) (examining entire cramdown case law from passage of Code to January 1993). "The
final and most general purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that the traditional mystique concerning cram
down which instills fear among secured creditors is exaggerated. Cram down is applied in a remarkably
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Furthermore, in disputes over these issues, debtors and creditors are forced into
adversarial proceedings where funds are redirected from the organization toward
expert witnesses and bankruptcy professionals, decreasing the probability of a
successful reorganization.78
Jack Friedman undertook a comprehensive analysis of the cramdown case law
from the* enactment of the Code in 1978 until January of 1993. 79 Friedman's
investigation revealed that there were only 175 published cases where plans had
been crammed down on secured creditors during the Code's first 15 years of
operation.80 Friedman also noted, "The overwhelming majority of cases involved
real estate as collateral (80% or more). In a significant minority of these cases, the
debtor's only asset was a single real estate property." 81 My interviews confirm Mr.
Friedman's conclusion-cramdowns occur with respect to major secured creditors
82only in single asset bankruptcies where they are frequent. Some noted that
cramdowns are often threatened and in effect negotiated against minor secured
creditors in conventional reorganizations. These creditors might have security in
certain office machines or other tangential assets, but would not be the principal
secured lender. Infrequent cramdowns, largely on smaller secured creditors, is still
the trend as confirmed by a survey of the reported cases from 2001 through 2003.3
Providing a stream of payments with a value equal to the value of the collateral
to a non-consenting secured creditor is essentially allowing the plan's proponent to
write a new loan. The real fight is over the discount rate; should $1million to be
paid 10 years from now be valued presently at $385,543.29 (a 10% discount rate) or
at $613,913.25 (a 5% discount rate)? Friedman determined, "there are almost fifty
Chapter 11 cases on this issue under clause (i), surprisingly, all but three cases cited
below held that the market rate for commercial loans is the correct legal standard
homogenous and predictable manner regarding secured claims." Id. Friedman concedes there are still
uncertainties regarding delay, valuation, and cost of the process. See id.
78 See Booth, supra note 77, at 104-05 (noting threat of cramdown is factor regarding settlement due to
problems associated with cramdowns).
79 See Friedman, supra note 77, at 1498 (stating author examined every cram down decision found under
current Code).
80 See id. (asserting 175 cases represented entire body of precedent).
8" Id. at 1507-08.
82 See id. at 1508.
83 A search for terms "I 129(b)(2)(A)" on Lexis, over the period of 1/1/2001 to 7/14/2003 yielded five
cases where chapter 11 cramdown plans had been attempted. Only two of the plans were confirmed pursuant
to 1129(b)(2)(A). See GE Capital Corp. v. Mach., Inc. (In re Mach., Inc.), 275 B.R. 303 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.
2002). Creditor had a $2,582,680.14 claim. Debtor proposed to cramdown a plan valuing creditors collateral
at $1,700,000. Creditor valued the collateral at $2,600,000 and made a motion for the court to determine the
value of the collateral. The court determined the value of the collateral was $1,668,000.00. Creditor appealed
but the appeal was dismissed. Id. at 305-07. There was no subsequent history. See In re Seatco, Inc., 257
B.R. 469 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001). Debtor manufactured custom van and truck seats and other accessories.
Id. at 472. Debtor was able to have a plan confirmed over objecting creditor, holding a $190,000 claim,
because creditor would retain its liens and receive payments for the current value of the collateral. Id. at 484.
WorldCom's bankruptcy case was also recently confirmed using 1129(b)(2)(A). See Barnaby Feder, Court
Approves WorldCom Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2003, at C3.
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for a secured creditor cramdown."84 The three outliers held that the original contract
rate was the correct standard. 85 Determining which market rate to apply is where
courts have diverged. Some courts determine the rates according to local lending
rates,86 including what the lender itself is charging for a similar loan. 7 Other courts
have used a formula rate where risk premiums are added to base rates, such as that
of a treasury bill 88 or a prime rate.89 None of these is perfect, and each -offers
purchase for any critic.
The other option for cramming down a plan on a secured creditor is to grant the
"indubitable equivalent" of its claim.90 Three types of cramdown proposals have
84 Friedman, supra note 77, at 1512.
85 See Confederation Life Ins. Co. v. Beau Rivage Ltd., 126 B.R. 632, 638 (N.D. Ga. 1991) ("[A] market
rate approach is not the exclusive means of insuring that Confederation Life receive the value of the amount
owed on the date the plan was confirmed."); In re Naugle's Nursery, Inc., 37 B.R. 574, 576 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1984) ("The Court should confirm a Plan pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) notwithstanding the lack of
acceptance by a creditor secured by mortgages on real property where these standards are met."); In re Patel,
21 B.R. 101, 105 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) ("This Court believes that where a seller negotiates a fixed rate
with a buyer for a purchase money mortgage on a particular piece of property, that rate is far more
persuasive than the money market or other sources of financial data.").
86 See, e.g., In re Stratford Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 145 B.R. 689, 702 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992) (stating rates for
similar loans in local region should be used); In re Hulen Park Place Ltd., 130 B.R. 39, 42 (N.D. Tex. 1991)
(stating rate is determined by looking to what regional lenders would charge in similar circumstances); In re
Memphis Partners, L.P., 99 B.R. 385, 386 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989) (asserting appropriate interest rate is
current market rates of interest used for similar loans in the region); In re Edgewater Motel, Inc., 85 B.R.
989, 996 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988) (commenting appropriate interest rate is current market rates of interest
used for similar loans in the region); In re McCombs Properties VIII, Ltd., 91 B.R. 907, 912 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1988) (adding risk factors); In re Arnold, 80 B.R. 806, 810-13 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1987) (noting
appropriate interest rate is current market rates of interest used for similar loans in the region); In re
Landmark at Plaza Park, Ltd., 7 B.R. 653, 657 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1980) (asserting appropriate interest rate is
current market rates of interest used for similar loans in the region).
87 See, e.g., In re Gene Dunavant & Son Dairy, 75 B.R. 328, 336 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987) (court factored
in rate lender charged); In re Timber Tracts, Inc., 70 B.R. 773, 776 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987) (same); In re
Foster, 79 B.R. 906, 911 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987) (same).
88 See, e.g., In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 165 (7th Cir. 1992) (adding 2.5% to Treasury note
rate); In re IPC Atlanta Ltd. P'ship, 142 B.R. 547, 557-58 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992) (adding 3% to Treasury
bond rate); In re Oak Partners, Ltd., 135 B.R. 440, 447 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (adding 3% to Treasury bond
rate); In re E.I. Parks No. 1 Ltd. P'ship, 122 B.R. 549, 556 n.4 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990) (adding 2.34% to
Treasury bond rate); In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 588 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989) (adding 2% to Treasury
security rate); In re Noe, 76 B.R. 675, 678-79 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1987) (adding 2% to Treasury bond rate);
In re Smithfield Estates, Inc., 52 B.R. 220, 225 n.5 (Bankr. DR.I. 1985) (adding 2% to Treasury bond rate).
89 See In re Ofra Corp., 129 B.R. 404, 421 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (adding 2% over prime rate); In re
Wood, No. 90-0042-C, 1991 WL 332637, at *8 (W.D. Va. Nov. 11, 1991) (adding 2% to prime rate); In re
Guilford Telecasters, Inc., 128 B.R. 622, 626 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 1991) (adding 1.5% to prime rate); In re
Manion, 127 B.R. 887, 889 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991) (stating interest rates would normally be 1.5% to 2%
over prime); In re Computer Optics, Inc., 126 B.R. 664, 670-72 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1991) (adding 2.5% to
prime rate and at 4% to Treasury bond rate); In re S.E.T. Income Props., III, 83 B.R. 791, 794 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 1988) (adding 1.5% to prime rate); In re Crane Auto., Inc., 88 B.R. 81, 85 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988)
(adding 2% to prime rate); In re 360 Inns, Ltd., 76 B.R. 573, 594 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (suggesting
debtor amend its plan to add 2.5% over prime rate); In re Lewis Indus., 75 B.R. 862,.870 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1987) (adding 2% to prime rate); In re Fursman Ranch, 38 B.R. 907, 913 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984) (using
rate slightly over prime).
90 See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2002) (authorizing adequate protection equal to indubitable equivalent of entities
interest in property); see also Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-America, 102 F.3d 874, 874 (7th Cir.
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emerged from the case law involving 1 129(b)(2)(A)(iii). The first type has been
characterized as a collateral substitution arrangement, where a lien from real
property is transferred to shares of stock.91 Successful proposals that substitute new
collateral do not increase creditors risk.92 Plans that propose complete payment in
the future, with no cash payments in the interim are called full accrual
arrangements. 93 Here courts require a large equity cushion and a relatively short-
term.94 More common are collateral payment plans, where the debtor surrenders the
value of the collateral to the secured lender for the value of the collateral at the time
of confirmation. 95 The Fifth Circuit in Sandy Ridge Development Corp. v. Louisiana
National Bank96 determined that "property is the indubitable equivalent of itself,
9 7
but other courts have not followed suit.
98
1996) (indicating "indubitable equivalence" of secured creditor's property interest meant payments including
interest that add up to present value of creditor's property interest); In re Arnold & Baker Farms, 85 F.3d
1415, 1423 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding debtor's plan to satisfy creditor's claim by transferring to creditor 566.5
of 1,320 acres of land securing debt did not provide creditor with indubitable equivalent of its secured
claim).
91 As of 1993, six of these plans had been proposed, and two approved. See Friedman, supra note 77, at
1533-35.
92 See In re Sun Country Dev., Inc., 764 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding twenty-one first liens
debtor held on lots it had sold were indubitable equivalent to first lien creditor held on two hundred adjacent
acres and that twenty-one first lien notes provided 86% equity cushion in hard assets over debt); In re San
Felipe @ Voss, Ltd., 115 B.R. 526, 528-529, 531-32 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (giving creditor package of stocks,
mostly in British company, for its first mortgage on office building). The court noted that the stocks had a
history of stability and liquidity, and gave the secured creditor an equity cushion of 21%. See id. at 531. For
collateral substitution plans not approved by the court, see In re Wester, 84 B.R. 771, 772 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
1988) (holding plan proposing to require objecting mortgagee to release land from lien in five acre tracts,
trade tracts for similar tracts owned by debtor's mother, and sell mother's tracts would not give mortgagee
"indubitable equivalent" of its claim); In re Future Energy Corp., 83 B.R. 470, 496 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988)
(holding proposed stock transfer to objecting creditors to satisfy their secured claims did not meet
requirement that objecting creditors receive "indubitable equivalent" of their claim); In re Hoff, 54 B.R. 746,
753-54 (Bankr. N.D. 1985) (indicating lien on future crops is not the "indubitable equivalent" of lien on
existing commodities); In re Elijah, 41 B.R. 348, 352 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984) (stating if sale of surrcndered
collateral does not pay claims in full then deficiency must be treated as secured claim).
93 As of 1993, three full accrual arrangements have been proposed and two have been approved. See
Friedman, supra note 77, at 1535-37.
94 See In re Pikes Peak Water Co., 779 F.2d 1456, 1459 (10th Cir. 1985) (approving plan provided interest
would accrue at 13% for thirty six months at which time debt had to be paid off or brought current.). The
court approved the plan because there was an estimated 20% equity cushion. Id. at 1461. See also Woods v.
Pine Mountain Ltd. (In re Pine Mountain, Ltd.), 80 B.R. 171, 174-75 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987) (approving full
interest accrual on $275,000 promissory note for thirty-nine months while land was developed and sold,
there was $900,000 equity cushion.).
95 As of 1993, twenty-two of these plans had been proposed, and nineteen approved. See Friedman, supra
note 77, at 1537-40.
96 See, e.g., In re Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp., 77 BR. 69, 80 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1987) overruled sub nom.
Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp. v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank (In re Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp.), 881 F.2d 1346, 1350 (5th
Cir. 1989) (debtor proposed to transfer partially developed property as full payment of their debt).9 7 
Id. at 80.
98 In re Martindale, 125 B.R. 32, 38 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1991) ("[I]n an uncertain market it is doubtful that
such a plan offers the creditor the indubitable equivalent of its claim unless the appraised value of the
property, demonstrated by competent proof, far exceeds the amount of the debt to be paid.").
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Most of the cases cited in the footnotes are penny ante cases; the general trend
is that few cramdowns involve big creditors in big cases. 99 A big creditor in a big
case may have a strong incentive to oppose a cramdown if it is a repeat bankruptcy
player, and determined opposition in such a case may be insurmountable. Too,
living with a hostile secured creditor who is looking for every opportunity to call a
default may be daunting.
B. 364(d)
Section 364(d) allows a DIP to grant security to a DIP lender that takes priority
over the interest of an existing secured creditor. '0 But to do this the DIP must show
that it cannot get credit otherwise and that it has provided adequate protection for
the existing secured creditor. 10 1 In practice these tests are seldom met. In fact the
ability to pass one of the tests may show an inability to pass the other: If there is
true adequate protection for the existing secured creditor, why can't the DIP find
someone else to lend? Put another way, does the refusal of a third party to lend
without a senior lien show that there can be no adequate protection?
An electronic search for 364(d) cases turns up only one chapter 11 case where
financing pursuant to 364(d) was proposed, and the court rejected the debtor's
proposal. l 2 This suggests that priming existing secured creditors is a desperate
99 Cf Friedman, supra note 77, at 1498-1508:
This Article analyzes every decision found in which a plan of reorganization was
crammed down on a secured creditor under the current Bankruptcy Code. The
approximately 175 cases discussed do not involve mere dicta, but represent the entire
body of actual precedent ....
... The overwhelming majority of cases involved real estate as the collateral (80% or
more).
Id. (citations omitted). A Lexis search of "1 129(b)(2)(A)" from January 17, 1993 until July 11, 2003 resulted
in 236 cases. These cases have not been examined. Included in this number are plans that were not approved,
as well as courts referencing 1129(b)(2)(A) jurisprudence in other chapter cases, thus the actual number of
1 129(b)(2)(A) plans that have been crammed down over the last ten years, is fewer than 236.
100 11 U.S.C § 364(d)(1) (2002):
The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining of credit or the
incurring of debt secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate that is
subject to a lien only if-
(A) the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise; and
(B) there is adequate protection of the interest of the holder of the lien on the
property of the estate on which such senior or equal lien is proposed to be
granted.
Id.
101 See Joseph U. Schorer & David S. Curry, Chapter 11 Lending: An Overview of the Process, THE
SECURED LENDER, Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 19-21 (asserting motion for financing must state terms are best
available and financing is necessary).
102 A search for terms "364(d)" was performed on Lexis for the time period of 8/30/2002 to 8/30/2003. The
search yielded eleven documents. Of the eleven documents, only one related to a chapter 11 proceeding in
which a debtor was moving to obtain secured credit by using a senior priming lien for a post-petition lender.
The debtor's motion was rejected because the existing lienholders would not be adequately protected. See In
re Windsor Hotel, L.L.C., 295 B.R. 307, 316-17 (Bankr. C.D. Il. 2003).
2004]
ABILA WREVIEW
measure, undertaken only by debtors who have no other possibilities. Of the few
cases that have allowed priming secured credit, the courts have found that there is
sufficient equity to protect the existing lienholder, as well as provide security for the
new lender.' 
03
The rules in 364(d) might be beside the point if the DIP needs cash at once. If,
as is common, the debtor was suffering illiquidity when it filed, it may need money
immediately to stay open. A victory under 364(d) against an existing recalcitrant
secured lender that might open the door to a new lender will be too late if it comes
only after a hearing that takes days or even weeks to schedule and try. So I surmise
that most going concerns-like airlines or a retail firm---cannot afford to litigate
with an existing secured creditor, for even a short shut down of such a business is
likely to destroy their going concern value. My interviews show that there is a way
around this problem in some cases.
Sometimes the court will allow the DIP loan to go forward with the
understanding that the existing secured creditor who might object may make its
objections later. The subject of that later hearing is the right of the DIP lender to
prime the existing lender under 364(d). Of course the DIP lender is likely to appear
in the white hat at that hearing. After all it is the DIP lender who is keeping the
debtor afloat and it is the pre petition secured creditor who is being difficult.
Depending on the terms of the original order, the DIP lender may get some cover
from 364(e). My interviews show that the likely outcome of this argument is not a
court decision; it is a negotiated deal under which the DIP lender gets priority but
the pre pre-petition secured creditor gets some new collateral, current payments or
assurance of payments. So it appears that 364(d) does come into play but only at a
level that seldom rises to view in reported opinions.
C. Special Collateral
In its original form the Code had special rules for lenders who held security
interests in aircraft and vessels. Those have since been expanded with the additions
103 See In re Snowshoe, 789 F.2d 1085, 1090 (4th Cir. 1986) (approving district courts permission to allow
trustee in bankruptcy to obtain additional credit by granting senior lien on property of estate pursuant to
364(d) over objection of Snowshoe's major creditor Shenandoah). Shenandoah claimed that their interest in
the estate was not adequately protected, and that Snowshoe had not made sufficient efforts to secure
additional credit. Id. at 1087-88. The appellate court approved the district courts authorization to incur up to
$2 million in debt, based on the findings that: Snowshoe owed Shenandoah between $13 and $14 million
dollars, the estate was worth over $19 million dollars, and the trustee made a good faith effort to secure
credit without granting the super-priority. Id. at 1089. See also Anchor Say. Bank FSB v. Sky Valley, Inc.,
99 B.R. 117, 119 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (district court approving bankruptcy court's authorization for super-
priority financing of approximately $425,000). The objecting creditor had a first priority security interest on
collateral worth $8 million to secure a loan of $3 million. The creditor's objection was that, "the debtor has
no equity in its property, considering all encumbrances against all assets, and because the debtor has
sustained negative cash flow and is not likely to reorganize." Id. at 118. The district court affirmed the
bankruptcy court's finding that the creditor was adequately protected by the equity cushion and approved the
financing. Id. at 119.
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of 1110(c) 10 4 and (d),' °5 and have been joined by section 555 (liquidation of
securities contracts), 556 (commodities contracts), 557 (grain assets), 559 (repos),
and 560 (swaps). Some of these have the characteristics of secured credit and, in
general, the special sections give the persons in the position of the secured creditor
rights to act free of the stay and outside of the bankruptcy process. 1
06
All of these sections have been justified on the ground that the collateral
covered or the transactions involved are unique. But can a clever lawyer structure a
more conventional loan so that it fits one of these sections?
D. 547(c) (2)
Under the current law ordinary course payments are not preferences even if
they meet the test of 547(b). °7 Before 1978 this exception was known as the de
minimis rule; not to worry about small payments. In the original Code the section
covered ordinary course payments but only if the payment was made "not later than
1o4 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I 1110.LH[2][c] (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th rev. ed. 2001):
Congress amended section 1110 through section 744 of the Wendall H. Ford Aviation
and Reform Act. In doing so, Congress further clarified and strengthened the rights of
secured parties, lessors, and conditional sales vendors with-respect to qualifying aircraft
and watercraft equipment. In addition to reconfiguring the section, Congress added new
section 1110(c), directing the trustee's surrender of equipment to the extent that a
secured party, lessor, or conditional sales vendor is entitled to possession under section
11 10(a)(1) and has made a written demand therefore. Congress also provided for the
surrender of certain records and documents in section 11 10(b)(3)(B).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
105 See id. 111 0.03[l][A]:
Furthermore, new section 11 l0(d)(1) (applicable only in cases commenced after
October 22, 1994), retroactively limits the ability of a court to recast a lease as a
security agreement with respect to equipment first placed in service on or before
October 22, 1994. Specifically, section 1110(d)(l) provides that a 'lease' within the
meaning of section 1110 includes 'any written agreement with respect to which the
lessor and the debtor, as lessee, have expressed in the agreement or in a substantially
contemporaneous writing that the agreement is to be treated as a lease for Federal
income tax purposes.' This provision was specifically intended to create a 'safe harbor'
to shield aircraft 'leases' from recharacterization as security agreements, thus making it
more difficult for a trustee in a case commenced after October 22, 1994 to recast a lease
of equipment first placed in service before October 22, 1994 as a general security
agreement in order to disqualify the lessor from obtaining the benefits of section 1110.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
106 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 555 (2002) (stating in some circumstances liquidations of securities contract shall
not be stayed); 11 U.S.C. § 557 (stating with respect to debtor who operates grain storage facilities,
procedure may be expedited upon request for relief from stay); 11 U.S.C. § 559 (stating exercise of
contractual right of repo participant to cause liquidation of repurchase agreement shall not be stayed), 11
U.S.C. § 560 (stating exercise of contractual right of swap participant in some instances shall not be stayed):
107 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (2002) (stating trustee may not avoid transfer made in ordinary course of
business); see also 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2002) (explicitly providing for exception contained in subsection (c)
thereby trustee may not avoid transfer of interest of debtor in property).
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45 days after such debt was incurred.' 108 In its original incarnation, apparently this
provision was intended to facilitate payment of small recurring bills, like utility
bills. After the 45 day limit was removed in 1984,109 creditors, including partially
secured creditors, began to claim its protection for sums that could be far beyond de
minimis.1l0 In Union Bank v. Wolas, 111 the Supreme Court confirmed that the
section applied even to payments on long-term debt to an institutional creditor."
2
In Wolas, the debtor borrowed $7 million from a bank, and filed for chapter 7
seven months later. 1 3 Within 90 days of filing for chapter 7, the debtor had paid
approximately $100,000 on interest, and $2,500 on loan fees to the bank." 4 The
trustee in Wolas tried to recover these payments as preferences, but the bankruptcy
court found that the loans and the payments on the loans had been made in the
ordinary course of business. 115 The district court upheld the bankruptcy court's
decision, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the ordinary course of business
exception to avoidance of preferential transfers was not available to long-term
creditors. 116 The Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit, and held that
payments on long-term debt, as well as those on short-term debt, may qualify for
the ordinary course of business exception to the trustee's power to avoid preferential
transfers.' 17
Since no payment to a fully secured creditor can be a preference under 547(b),
strictly this change does not help secured creditors, but many creditors are only
partially secured, or depending on the valuation of their collateral, may or may not
be fully secured, so the section gives them some cover in cases on the margin.
108 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 547.04[2] (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th rev. ed. 2001) ("As
originally enacted, section 547(c)(2) required transfer to have been made within 45 days after the debt was
incurred in order to qualify for ordinary course of business exception.").
109 See id. (stating "in 1984, Congress eliminated the 45-day requirement.").
110 See id. 547.04[2][a][i]:
As early as 1989, however, courts began interpreting subparagraph (C) as requiring an
independent inquiry into whether the payment practice at issue comports with industry
standards. At least 10 [sic] of the courts of appeals have now adopted this view. This
shift in interpretation coincided with the repeal of the 45-day limit, the onslaught of
cases in which the defendant sought to use the ordinary course of business defense and
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Union Bank v. Wolas. The march of
the circuits to the holding that subparagraph (C) requires an independent analysis of the
standard of the industry was based partially upon the principle of statutory construction
that '[a]n interpretation of § 547(c)(2)(C) which focuses exclusively on the relationship
between the creditor and the debtor, would deprive subsection (c)(2)(C) of any
independent meaning because (C)(3)(B) already requires that the payment be evaluated
in the context of the ongoing relationship between the debtor and the creditor.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
M 502 U.S. 151 (1991).
11
2 Id. at 162-63.
. 3 Id. at 152-53.
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E. 507(b) Inadequate Adequate Protection
I indicate above that one of the recurring worries of secured creditors is that
courts will give them protection under section 361 that the court finds to be
adequate but that is not.' 8 A protection against that risk is buried in section
507(b)."19 Where the adequate protection proves not adequate, the recipient of the
protection has a right to treat the resulting loss as an administrative expense under
507(a)(1) and, better, an expense that goes to the head of the 507(a)(1) line, ahead
of the lawyers, accountants and other post petition creditors.
To enjoy this benefit the debtor must have "provided" adequate protection to
the creditor. That is why even secured creditors who do not expect to get much
may ask for adequate protection under 363(e) even if they do not ask to have the
stay lifted under 362(d). And this perfunctory motion may not be seriously
challenged by the debtor. The debtor has little to lose by agreeing to some grants of
adequate protection. If the reorganization fails, the payment under 507 will come
from unsecureds and others lower down the chain, not from the debtor who will be
dead. The motion and order for adequate protection merely fulfills the condition
precedent for recovery under 507(b).
20
Establishing the right to a superpriority does not necessarily preclude payments
being made to administrative claimants having a lower priority. Payment will
depend on the court's determination of whether there are likely to be sufficient
assets for payment of all administrative expenses.1 21 Adequate protection cannot be
assumed from the circumstances, 122 but a superpriority claim may be asserted on the
"'See infra pp. 146-47.
u9 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2002) (granting priority to secured creditor's claim over any other claims
allowable under same subsection assuming trustee has provided adequate protection).
120 See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 507.12, at n.4 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 2001):
It should be noted that section 361(3) prohibits using the grant of an administrative
expense as the sole method of providing adequate protection to a secured creditor. That
section does not, however, prohibit an agreement or order providing that the creditor
shall have an administrative expense for its losses if the other adequate protection fails
to protect the creditor's interest.
Id.; see also In re Carpet Center Leasing Co., 4 F.3d 940, 941 (11th Cir. 1993) ("Despite . . . ex ante
prohibition on the use of an administrative expense claim, it is specifically allowed as a remedy for the later
failure of the adequate protection granted."); In re Cason, 190 B.R. 917, 922 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995)
("[W]hen adequate protection is given which later turns out to be inadequate, the creditor is entitled to
request superpriority administrative expense status.").
I See In re Moulton Excavating, 143 B.R. 955, 956 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992) (stating when superpriority is
granted and estate appears insolvent, no payments should be made other than to holder of superpriority
claim); In re Wise Transp., Inc., 148 B.R. 52, 54 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992) (same); In re Callister, 15 B.R.
521, 534 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (asserting existence of superpriority claim does not prohibit payment of
interim compensation under section 331). But see In re Wilson-Seafresh, Inc., 263 B.R. 624, 631 (Bankr.
N.D. Fla. 2001) (requiring interim fee awards to be disgorged due to unpaid superpriority claim).
122 In re Five Star Partners, L.P., 193 B.R. 603, 609 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) (providing adequate protection
must be affirmatively provided and cannot be implied from mere denial of motion for relief from stay); In re
James B. Downing & Co., 94 B.R. 515, 520 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1988) (same).
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basis of adequate protection provided without prior court approval. 123 Determining
the amount of a superpriority claim under 507(b) depends on how the claim arose.
The amount of a claim awarded a 507(b) priority may not be greater than the
damage caused by the stay. In the case of In re J.F.K. Acquisitions Corp.,12 4 the
possessor of a first mortgage on the J.F.K. Hilton filed a motion seeking relief from
the 362 stay alleging the debtor had no equity in the property. 125 According to the
creditor, the collateral was worth only $16.7 million while the debtor owed $20.2
million. 126 The court found the value of the property to be $21 million, based on the
debtor's valuation of the property at over $30 million, and denied relief from the
automatic stay. 127 The debtor was ordered to give a stream of payments as adequate
protection. 128 When the motion was made to fix the value of the payments, 10
months later, the debtor valued the hotel at $10 million.' 29 The court valued the
hotel at $16.5 million, and granted a superpriority claim for the creditor for $4.5
million, the difference between the amount of the creditor's claim and its probable
recovery from the remaining collateral. 130 This is the damage caused by the stay if
the collateral once had a greater value than the amount of the claim.
When a 507(b) claim arises from the trustee's use of property pursuant to
section 363, the amount of the claim is the decrease in value attributable to the
trustee's use of the property. In Bonapel v. Nalley Motor Trucks,13 the debtor, who
operated a fleet of tractors and trailers, was allowed to continue using twenty-six
tractors in exchange for monthly adequate protection payments. 132 The value of the
tractors at the time of the automatic stay was $575,000.133 The debtor failed to make
timely adequate protection payments, and the automatic stay was lifted. 134 The
tractors at this point were valued only as salvage and sold for $60,000.135 The
debtor had made adequate protection payments of $108,500.136 The court awarded
the creditor a 507(b) claim for $370,000, the inadequacy of the adequate protection
limited to the amount paid by Nalley pursuant to a recourse obligation.'
37
For DIP lenders there is a more direct route to 507(b). Some DIP lending
agreements explicitly provide for treatment of any deficiency under 507(b) if the
123 In re Blehm Land & Cattle Co., 859 F.2d 137, 140 (10th Cir. 1988) ("[N]either the Code nor its
legislative history supports the interpretation that court approval of an ex parte adequate protection
agreement is a prerequisite to a 507(b) expense.").
124 166 B.R. 207 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994).
125 Id. at 208.
126 Id. at 209
127Id. at 210.
128 Id. at 209.
129 id.
13 Id. at 212.
131 991 F.2d 682 (1 1th Cir. 1993).






117 Id. at 684-85.
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collateral proves inadequate to pay off the DIP loan. While it is not obvious that a
debtor and a DIP lender can so invoke 507(b) by agreement without action of the
court and without meeting the terms of the section, a judge that blesses the DIP loan
with an order is probably disposed to recognize the 507 right if the DIP lender
needs to invoke it later in the same case where the judge has already approved the
DIP lender's documents.
V. PROTECTION ARISING FROM AGREEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR'3 8
By hypothesis most public firms that file in chapter 11 need money. They have
used up their available capital in operating losses, unexpected tort or contract
liability, or have made improvident investments. Because of their financial plight
they are excluded from the public borrowing markets. To survive they must usually
turn to a "DIP lender;" the DIP lender might be the firm's existing secured creditor
or it might be a new lender who may partner with the existing lender.139 Section 364
is a roadmap for secured and unsecured lending to a DIP.' 40 It authorizes not only
unsecured credit that will be treated as an administrative expense (and so paid ahead
of the unsecured creditors) but also secured credit.' 41 In every case post petition
lending of this -kind will bear interest at the rate agreed and both principal and
interest will have administrative priority-superior to the priority of the debtor's pre
petition unsecured creditors.
Beginning in the early 90's 42 secured creditors realized that by agreeing to
become the DIP lender they might make money on any new loans and, more to the
point for us, might avoid many of the traps that the Code and the cases put before
pre-petition secured creditors. Now facing bankruptcy, the debtor had become a
pigeon. The debtor, who earlier might have played one potential creditor against
another to get the best terms, had lost its bargaining position. The imminence of
bankruptcy will have scared off other lenders and the debtor might face liquidation
if it had to go into chapter 11 without new money. Such a debtor would be
amenable to terms in a loan agreement that would limit its rights. And such a
debtor would cheerfully accept terms that strengthen the DIP lender's hand against
138 For several tricks and tactics used by DIP Lenders, see Schorer & Curry, supra note 101, at 12-13
(suggesting premium returns enjoyed by DIP financers would soon disappear).
139 To enjoy all of the benefits described in this section the existing lender must become a DIP lender. If
the existing secured lender chooses not to join the DIP financing, it is unlikely to be subordinated under
section 364(d) against its wishes, but it may be forced to subordinate as the cost of attracting another to be
the DIP lender. If that happens, the existing secured creditor will usually get some form of adequate
protection payments but little else. By joining the DIP lending the existing secured creditor can get the
benefit of the many important promises that will be in the DIP lending agreement and may also enjoy current
payments of interest and, perhaps, even a rollup.
140 See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2002) (detailing how trustee may obtain unsecured credit and incur debt secured
by liens).
141 See id
142 Sometime between 1990 and 1995 several lenders came to understand that DIP financing was relatively
safe and quite profitable. As the market developed and become more mature, the rates that had been 400 to
600 basis points or more over prime, dropped. However banks are hesitant to pick up letter of credit liability.
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trade and other unsecured creditors, for there the debtor truly would be spending
another's money. 
143
But not every court will let the DIP lender have his way with the debtor.
44
Some courts might be hesitant to let the debtor trade away the rights of absent
unsecureds even to a powerful DIP lender whose loan might be critical to the
debtors' life. Understand that granting priority to a large new loan carries the
possibility that pre-petition unsecured creditors, who might receive a payment in a
prompt liquidation, might get nothing in a later liquidation or reorganization where
the DIP lender had to be paid first. Too, some courts might find that the debtor's
grant of rights to the DIP lender (or its disavowal of rights such as the stay's
protection) invaded the court's prerogatives. 145
The solution to these problems was to find a court that appreciated the
importance of the DIP lender and respected the debtor's agreements with that lender
even when those agreements might step on other toes. But how to find such a
court?
Here the debtor, encouraged by his potential DIP lender, turned to the generous
venue rules applicable to chapter II cases.' 46 Under section 1408 a debtor may file
in any court where it is "domiciled", where its "principal place of business" is, or
where its "principal assets" are located.' 47 Even better, it can file anywhere there is a
pending case concerning any "affiliate."' 148 Every subsidiary is an affiliate under
143 As this was written in 2003 several institutions have developed a reputation and expertise as DIP
lenders. Among them are JP Morgan Chase, Citibank, Wachovia and several non-bank lenders including
General Electric Credit, CIT, Foothill and Cerberus. Usually, however, if a large bank has extended secured
credit to the debtor, it will wind up as the DIP lender as well. There are exceptions to this rule, however, as
Chase will often go hunting for the opportunity to become the DIP lender.
144 See William Barnett, Test Your Expertise - DIP Financing, 20 No. BANKR. STRATEGIST 3, 3 (2003)
("Bankruptcy courts understand the role of the DIP lender and, within limits, are willing to approve DIP
financing agreements that disproportionately favor the DIP lender over the debt . . . . As with other
categories default provisions may or may not be granted depending upon the policy of the particular
bankruptcy judge.").
145 See In re Pease, 195 B.R. 431, 435 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) (refusing to enforce pre-petition agreement
between debtor and creditor that would limit use of automatic stay provision); In re Madison, 184 B.R. 686,
690 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding debtor's agreement to temporarily forego bankruptcy protection violates
public policy and is unenforceable).
146 See 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2002).
[A] case under title 11 may be commenced in the district court for the district -
(1) in which the domicile, residence, principal place of business in the
United States, or principal assets in the United States, of the person or
entity that is the subject of such case have been located for the one
hundred and eighty days immediately preceding such commencement,
or for a longer portion of such one hundred and eighty day period than
the domicile, residence, or principal place of business, in the United
States, or principal assets in the United States, or such person were
located in any other district; or
(2) in which there is pending a case under title I 1 concerning such person's
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section 101(2). 149 These rules explain why one looking for the bankruptcy of
Eastern Airlines, headquartered in Miami, finds it under the name of "Ionosphere
Clubs" in New York, 150 why Enron, with its headquarters in Houston, was able to
file in New York, 151 and why dozens of companies incorporated in Delaware but
having no other connection with the state have been able to file there.
152
It is now common 153 for the debtor and its existing principal secured creditor, if
there is one, or the debtor and any other creditor who is willing to do DIP lending to
negotiate before the filing. 54 One issue to be discussed with the potential DIP
lender is the place of filing. 155 If some or many of the judges in the District where
the debtor proposes to file are hostile to terms that the DIP lender wants in its loan
agreement, the lender can refuse to lend. Particularly when the secured's major
issues have to do mostly with the secured rights vis'a vis unsecureds, the debtor
may be indifferent about the place of filing. We now observe a large number of
filings in Delaware and, more recently, some filings in the Southern District of New
York and in Chicago. 156 I believe that this pattern of filing is directly responsive to
the DIP and DIP lender's interests. Both the lender and the debtor probably want
certainty; for the DIP lender that certainty means assurance that its favorite clauses
in the cash collateral order and in the DIP lending agreement will be acceptable to
the court. If the District has a couple of hare-brained judges, if its rules and
practices are not well spelled out, or if it has rules' 57 or decisions on important
149 See 11 U.S.C. § 10 1(2) (2002) (defining "affiliate").
15o See, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, 111 B.R. 436 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large,
Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 11, 22 (1991) (stating Eastern was headquartered in Miami,
yet filed for bankruptcy in New York through small subsidiary).
151 See, e.g., In re Enron Corp., 281 B.R. 836 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Catherine E. Vance &
Paige Barr, The Facts & Fiction of Bankruptcy Reform, I DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 361, 384 n.93 (2003)
(discussing why Enron was able to file in New York).
152 am told that United Airlines, that filed at home in Chicago, believed it could have found proper venue
in more than one dozen jurisdictions.
153 See, e.g., David Bond, United's DIP Loans Require Profit in 2003, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
Dec. 16, 2002, at 26 ("United began debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing talks late in September, even as it
pursued Air Transportation Stabilization Board (ATSB) approval of a $1.8-billion loan guarantee .... ");
Edward Wong, United Works to Pull Together a Financing Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, at 44 (reporting
United was waiting until DIP financing negotiations were complete to file chapter 11).
154 One of my interviewees said that it is desirable and common to have almost all of the terms of the DIP
loan agreement negotiated before the filing. Others tell of cases where the baby came too soon and the
parties arrive in court with only a term sheet for the court's approval.
'55 My interviewees knew of no case where a DIP lender insisted on a particular place, but they all
confirmed that the place of filing was discussed by the DIP and DIP lender and that place of filing would be
an important question for the DIP lender.
156 Chicago may be a problematic venue for any debtor who needs an expansive critical vendor ruling. See
In re Kmart Corp., No. 03-1956, 2004 WL 343520 (7th Cir. Feb. 24, 2004).
157 For example, some DIP lenders are concerned that the courts allow "rollups," described below. For
example, Massachusetts' rules allow rollups, provided that they are disclosed. MASS. L. BANKR. R. 4001-
2(c) and 4001-2(d):
(c) Subject to section (d), the following provisions contained in an agreement
between the debtor and the holder of a secured claim as to use of cash collateral,
obtaining credit, or adequate protection, or any interim or final order approving or
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issues that are anathema to any of the important players (debtor, secured creditor,
critical vendor), no bankruptcy of a large public company will darken its door.
158
Perhaps because the SEC or an SEC nominated trustee had the whip hand in
chapter X cases under the Act, 159 in 1978 no one seems to have foreseen this
alliance between the debtor and its principal secured creditor to manipulate the
venue rules for their common interest. In fact the removal of the SEC 60 has
fostered the current bargain between the debtor and its principal secured creditor.
Under chapter X, the SEC had the right to intervene as a party in interest in large
bankruptcies,' 61 give an advisory report on the confirmation of the plan,162 and
authorizing the use of cash collateral, obtaining credit, or adequate protection,
shall be unenforceable:
(1) any acknowledgement of the validity, amount, perfection, priority,
extent, or enforceability of the secured claim, if the agreement or order
purports to bind any party other than the debtor, unless the agreement
or order affords an objection period of not less than ninety (90) days
after (i) for any party in interest, the entry of the order approving the
agreement; (ii) for the creditor's committee, the entry of an order
approving the employment of counsel to the creditor's committee; and
(iii) for a Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 trustee, the entry of an order
approving the employment of counsel to said Chapter 11 or Chapter 7
trustee;
(2) any waiver of defenses by the debtor or estate representative;
(3) any post-petition lien which purports to secure any claim of a secured
creditor other than (i) a claim arising from postpetition advances which
constitute an additional non-replacement extension of credit; or (ii) a
claim representing the diminution in value of the secured claim after the
commencement of the case;
(4) any grant of a security interest in avoidance power recoveries available
to the trustee;
(5) any provision granting a creditor relief from the automatic stay without
further order or hearing upon the breach of the cash collateral, adequate
protection or postpetition financing order or agreement; or
(6) any waiver by the debtor or the estate representative of rights provided
by 11 U.S.C. § 506(c), in whole or part.
(d) Notwithstanding section (c), the Court may order enforcement of any terms and
conditions on the use of cash collateral or obtaining credit, provided that (i) the
proposed order or agreement specifically states that the proposed terms and
conditions vary from the requirements of section (c), and (ii) any such proposed
terms and conditions are conspicuously and specifically set forth in the proposed
agreement or order.
Id.
58 See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
59 See SKEEL, supra note 3, at 160-66 (stating chapter X provided SEC with pervasive oversight role).
160 See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2002) (implying SEC is not party in interest).
161 See 11 U.S.C. § 608 (repealed 1978):
The Securities and Exchange Commission shall, if requested by the judge, and may,
upon its own motion if approved by the judge, file a notice of its appearance in a
proceeding under this chapter. Upon the filing of such a notice, the Commission shall
be deemed to be a party in interest, with the right to be heard on all matters arising in
such proceeding, and shall be deemed to have intervened in respect of all matters in
such proceeding with the same force and effect as if a petition for that purpose had been
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forestall confirmation of the plan by refusing to release the report. 63 In addition the
SEC had effective control over trustees by its ability to appoint and fix the
compensation of all officers, attorneys and examiners. 64 If neither the existing
management nor its lawyers were going to be around after the petition was filed in
chapter X, they had no incentive and little power to negotiate with any existing
creditor. The removal of the SEC from the process and the replacement of the
trustee with the DIP have created both the incentive and the possibility for the
negotiations that we now observe.
Note too why any opposing cries from trade and most other unsecured creditors
are muffled. Until the bankruptcy petition is filed, there is no creditor's committee
and until then no unsecured creditor may have a large enough stake to make it
worth his while to monitor the debtor's behavior or to bargain with him over place
of filing. Some of the orders on cash collateral and perhaps on the DIP lending will
be tentatively approved before any committee of unsecured creditors is
appointed. 65 My purpose is not to enter the debate over the merits of the venue
rules but only to explain how those rules and the bargains struck between the DIP
lender and the debtor facilitate the lender getting what it needs by agreement with
the debtor.
allowed by the judge; but the Commission may not appeal or file any petition for
appeal in any such proceeding.
Id.
162 See 11 U.S.C. § 572 (repealed 1978):
After the hearing, as provided in section 569 or section 570 of this title, and before the
approval of any plan . . . the judge may, if the scheduled indebtedness of the debtor
does not exceed $3,000,000, and shall, if such indebtedness exceeds $3,000,000, submit
to the Securities and Exchange Commission for examination and report the plan or
plans which the judge regards as worthy of consideration. Such report shall be advisory
only.
Id.
163 See 11 U.S.C. § 573 (repealed 1978):
The judge shall not enter an order approving a plan submitted to the Securities and
Exchange Commission until after the Securities and Exchange Commission has filed its
report thereon or has notified the judge that it will not file a report, or until the
expiration of such reasonable time for the filing of such report as the judge has fixed,
whichever first occurs.
Id.
'64 See 11 U.S.C. § 665(b) (repealed 1978):
The provisions of section 78d(b) of title 15 shall be applicable with respect to the
power of the Securities and Exchange Commission to appoint and fix the compensation
of such officers, attorneys, examiners, and other experts, and such other officers and
employees, as may be necessary for carrying out its functions under this chapter.
Id.
165 The order in United Airlines, for example, was approved tentatively allowing unsecured creditors a 30-
day period to file any objections. See In re UAL Corp., No. 02-B-48191 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 2002) (Final order




A. Converting Pre-Petition Debts into Post-Petition "Rollups"
Section 364 authorizes a debtor in chapter 11 to "obtain credit.' 166 Subsections
(a) and (b) authorize unsecured lending and give those loans administrative expense
status under section 503(b)(1). 167 Implicit in the grant of administrative expense
166 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2002) provides:
(a) If the trustee is authorized to operate the business of the debtor under section 721,
1108, 1203, 1204, or 1304 of this title, unless the court orders otherwise, the
trustee may obtain unsecured credit and incur unsecured debt in the ordinary
course of business allowable under section 503(b)(1) of this title as an
administrative expense.
(b) The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the trustee to obtain
unsecured credit or to incur unsecured debt other than under subsection (a) of this
section, allowable under section 503(b)(1) of this title as an administrative
expense.
(c) If the trustee is unable to obtain unsecured credit allowable under section
503(b)(1) of this title as an administrative expense, the court, after notice and a
hearing, may authorize the obtaining of credit or the incurring of debt--
(1) with priority over any or all administrative expenses of the kind
specified in section 503(b) or 507(b) of this title;
(2) secured by a lien on property of the estate that is not otherwise subject
to a lien; or
(3) secured by a junior lien on property of the estate that is subject to a lien.
(d)
(1) The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining of
credit or the incurring of debt secured by a senior or equal lien on
property of the estate that is subject to a lien only if--
(A) the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise; and
(B) there is adequate protection of the interest of the holder of
the lien on the property of the estate on which such senior or
equal lien is proposed to be granted.
(2) In any hearing under this subsection, the trustee has the burden of
proof on the issue of adequate protection.
(e) The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under this section to
obtain credit or incur debt, or of a grant under this section of a priority or a lien,
does not affect the validity of any debt so incurred, or any priority or lien so
granted, to an entity that extended such credit in good faith, whether or not such
entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and the
incurring of such debt, or the granting of such priority or lien, were stayed
pending appeal.
(f) Except with respect to an entity that is an underwriter as defined in section
1145(b) of this title, section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 [15 USCS § 77e], the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939 [15 USCS §§ 77aaa et seq.], and any State or local
law requiring registration for offer or sale of a security or registration or licensing
of an issuer of, underwriter of, or broker or dealer in, a security does not apply to
the offer or sale under this section of a security that is not an equity security.
16 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) (2002) provides:
(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed, administrative expenses, other than claims
allowed under section 502(f) of this title, including-
(1)
(A) the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages,
salaries, or commissions for services rendered after the commencement of the
case;
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status is the right to receive market rate interest in the ordinary course and current
repayment of principal. Subsection (c) authorizes secured debt and subsection (d)
allows secured debt that primes existing secured debt. 68 All of the debt authorized
under section 364 primes pre petition unsecured debt.
If only pre-petition secured creditors could find a way to transform themselves
into post-petition secured creditors with robust collateral, most of their concerns
described above would be alleviated. Since they would be paid current interest at
market rates, the opportunity to reinvest would be recaptured. Since they would
have the pick of the collateral litter, concerns about insufficient collateral or about
its decline in value leading up to the bankruptcy would be gone. Since they would
be bargaining with a needy debtor, they could demand a large cushion of collateral
and insist on protection of that position by the toughest of warranties and promises.
Nothing in the Code explicitly permits changing pre-petition debt into post-
petition debt, and the logic of cases like In re Alyucan Interstate Corp. 169 and
United Savings Assoc. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc. 170 conflicts with
the idea that such a transformation of pre-petition debt into post-petition priority
debt is permitted under the Code. If section 506 means that pre-petition debt earns
no interest during the proceeding, what logic says that a new name on that old debt
changes the legal rule? If there is no adequate protection for an equity cushion
under Alyucan, what logic permits the securing of old debt with new assets of the
bankrupt debtor?
A few early cases traveling under the name of "cross-collateralization" deal
tangentially with these issues. 171 In those cases the parties proposed to allow pre-
petition secured debt to be secured by post-petition assets. Of course, such
collateralization should be permitted to the extent that the new collateral replaced
(B) any tax-
(i) incurred by the estate, except a tax of a kind
specified in section 507(a)(8) of this title; or
(ii) attributable to an excessive allowance of a
tentative carryback adjustment that the estate
received, whether the taxable year to which such
adjustment relates ended before or after the
commencement of the case; and
(C) any fine, penalty, or reduction in credit relating to a tax of a kind specified in
subparagraph (B) of this paragraph.
Id.
168 See id.
169 12 B.R. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
170 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
171 See In re Keystone Camera Prods. Corp., 126 B.R. 177, 182 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1991) (validating cross-
collaterization if loan would otherwise be unobtainable); In re Beker Indus. Corp., 58 B.R. 725, 742 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[F]orward cross-collateralization has thus been permitted where, inter alia, there was no
objection by unsecured creditors because they agree that the lender's pre-petition loan was fully secured by a
perfected security interest."); In re Vanguard Diversified, Inc., 31 B.R. 364, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(allowing cross-collateralization, but indicating practice is disfavored). But see In re Saybrook Mfg. Co., 963




collateral that was held when the petition was filed and consumed in the debtor's
business. But what about new collateral that does not replace the old? Under the
Act, cross-collateralization may have been permissible but only on proper notice
and a hearing confirming that the post-petition debt could not be obtained in any
other fashion. 
72
Whatever its legal merits, the practice of rolling up old secured debt into new,
post-petition secured debt has become frequent if not commonplace. 73 Sometimes
the rollup occurs on soft little creditors' feet; this is where an existing revolving loan
is authorized to continue and the after-acquired clause is permitted to survive the
filing under 552. 174 Each payment on the loan reduces the pre-petition debt and each
advance on the revolving loan increases the principal balance of the post-petition
364 loan. When the loan has gone through one complete cycle after the filing, it has
all become post-petition secured debt entitled to current interest and to heightened
priority. 75  If one did not look closely at the documents, this quiet
transmogrification might be missed. And if it is done under an agreement that
invokes 507(b) successfully, any part of the loan that is not liquidated on the sale of
collateral will be entitled not just to administrative expense priority but to elevated
administrative expense priority-it goes to the head of the administrative priority
line.
176
Some rollups are noisy. In some cases the DIP lender pays off the existing loan
in full. 177 That payment is treated as the first advance on the post-petition secured
172 In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1099 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.) (indicating cross-collateralization
can only be allowed under Act if there is notice, hearing and showing of need by DIP that financing cannot
otherwise be obtained).
173 There were rollups in Lamonts Apparel, Inc. (Wash.) Case No. 00-00045, Republic Technology (Ohio)
Case No. 01-51117, Loews Cineplex (S.D.N.Y.) Case No. 01-12974 and Covanta Energy (S.D.N.Y.) Case
No. 02-40826.
174 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2002) (stating "property acquired by the estate or by the debtor after
the commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any security agreement entered into
by the debtor before the commencement of the case.").
M7 See 1 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (stating "with respect to a claim of a kind specified in section 507(a)(1)
or 507(a)(2) of this title, on the effective date of the plan, the holder of such claim will receive on account of
such claim cash equal to the allowed amount of such claim."). Section 507(a)(1) gives 503(b) administrative
expenses top priority. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1). Since section 503(b)(1)(A) administrative expenses include
all "actual, necessary costs of preserving the estate", if payment were not made on the post-petition loan it
would become an administrative expense, and receive the highest priority. See 11 U.S.C. 503(b). Thus it will
be more difficult to cramdown a plan against the wishes of the DIP lender using a rollup, and the DIP lender
has more effective control over the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 503; 11 U.S.C. § 507.
176 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(b):
If the trustee, under section 362, 363, or 364 of this title, provides adequate protection
of the interest of a holder of a claim secured by a lien on property of the debtor and if,
notwithstanding such protection, such creditor as a claim allowable under subsection
(a)(1) of this section arising from the stay of action against such property under section
362 of this title, from the use, sale, or lease of such property under section 363 of this
title, or from the granting of a lien under section 364(d) of this title, then such creditor's
claim under such subsection shall have priority over every other claim allowable under
such subsection.
177 See cases cited supra note 173.
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loan; it instantly transforms pre-petition debt to post-petition. No one could miss
that event.
Under the guidelines, 7 8 in Delaware rollups are permitted only where they are
identified in the motion to approve financing and are "justified,"179 New York
requires a hearing to approve rollup,180 and Massachusetts forbids securing pre-
petition collateral with post-petition debt without a clear reason.1 8 ' Whether and
how any particular rollup is "justified" is a question for another time. The absence
of published judicial defenses of the practice might make one skeptical about courts'
ability to find proper justification.
B. Debtor's Appointment of Creditor's Representative
In some cases the DIP lender insists on the DIP's informal or formal agreement
to appoint a person called a Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO).18 2 In the words of
several bankruptcy lawyers familiar with the practice, the DIP may appoint anyone
in the world-as long as that person is on the secured creditor's list of three
approved candidates. Many of these appointments go to members of three firms:
AlixPartners LLC, Alvarez and Marsala, and Kroll Zolfo Cooper.' 83 While this
178 The guidelines given in each state accurately reflect what lenders are doing and not what they are
allowed to do. In this sense they are responsive to tricks that lenders try to slip by and force lenders to
highlight when they are using these "tricks". Delaware's guidelines, for example, are given in a letter written
by Chief Judge Walsh of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, noting that they were set forth to help limit first-
day orders, but that a set of blanket prohibitions would not be practicable. For an excellent discussion of
these rules, see Scott Cousins, Postpetition Financing ofDot-Cons, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 759, 781 (2002).
179 See DEL. L. BANKR. R. 4001-2(a)(i) (2002):
All Financing Motions must (1) recite whether the proposed form of order and/or
underlying cash collateral stipulation or loan agreement contains any provision of the
type indicated below, (2) identify the location of any such provision in the proposed
form of order, cash collateral stipulation and/or loan agreement, and (3) the justification
for the inclusion of such provision:
(E) Provisions that deem prepetition secured debt to be post-petition debt or
that use post-petition loans from a prepetition secured creditor to pay
part or all of that secured creditor's prepetition debt, other than as
provided in 11 U.S.C. section 552(b).
Id.
1'0 See N.Y. L. BANKR. R. 4001-2 (stating "A motion pursuant to § 364(c) and (d) of the Bankruptcy Code
seeking priority for obtaining credit or incurring debt shall state whether priority over any administrative
expense specified in § 503(b) or § 507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code is sought.").
81 See MAsS. L. BANKR. R., supra note 157.
182 See Douglas Baird & Martin Bienenstock, Symposium: Mega-Bankruptcies: Representing Creditors
and Debtors in Large Bankruptcies, 1 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 589 (2003) ("For example, debtor may
have to hire a chief restructuring as a condition of the DIP loan."); Douglas Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen,
Reply Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REv. 673, 685 (2003) (noting Worldcom's DIP financing
agreement required board to hire chief restructuring officer).
183 For example, Stephen Cooper is currently the CEO of Enron, available at http://money.cnn.com/
2002/01/29/news/enronroundup/ (Jan. 29, 2002) and Gregory F. Rayburn of AlixPartners LLC was
appointed by Worldcom. as chief restructuring officeer, available at http://www.computerworld.com/
managementtopics/outsourcing/isptelecom/story/0,10801,73088,00.html (July 29, 2002). CRO's were also
appointed in Pharmor (Alvarez), Nations Rent (Zolfo), Metromedia (A&M), and Warnaco (Alvarez).
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person is not truly an agent of the secured creditor, usually his bread is buttered by
the secured creditor not by the DIP. The CRO's are repeat players in the bankruptcy
process, and they offend the secured creditor who nominated them only at the cost
of losing future nominations.
For fear of making such a person truly an agent and so incurring liability for his
acts or failure to act, the DIP lender would prefer to have the CRO's duties left to
informal understandings or to general practices and expectations that do not rise to
the level of formal agreements about the CRO's duty to his sponsor. For that reason
one finds scarcely any reference to the CRO in the many pages of agreements
signed by the DIP who has informally agreed to take on a CRO.
My interviews tell that there are considerable variations in the work and terms
of employment of CRO's. In some cases the CRO has been hired by the debtor
before the bankruptcy or at least before the DIP lender insisted on it. In those cases
the CRO is beholden mostly to the debtor who brought him there, and not directly
to the secured creditor. Also different CRO's have different skills. Some are
accountants, there to straighten out the accounting; some are managers, there to
manage in place of prior failed managers. 1
84
A CRO's experience as a professional manager of distressed companies may
give him knowledge of solutions to problems that face companies in chapter 11 that
far exceeds the knowledge of regular management. To that extent the CRO can be
presented and regarded as a friendly advisor to the DIP. I suspect that a DIP lender
sponsored CRO also fills a role not welcomed by the DIP; he can be a spy for the
DIP lender to see that the DIP toes the line and to squeal on him when he does not.
Because of his status as the eminence grise little is written on the workings of
the CRO and even less appears in the cases. Surely a good CRO brings experience
and wise counsel to chapter 11 management that has never seen a chapter 11
proceeding before. One might expect that the CRO's suggestion to a patron DIP
lender sometimes moves existing management out the door. His reports might call
for a tightening of the DIP lending agreement, and presumably the CRO would have
input to any decision of the lender to force liquidation. The CRO gives the DIP
lender better intelligence and greater assurance that the DIP is conforming to his
promises than the DIP lender would have otherwise.
C. DIP's Agreements to Forego Bankruptcy Rights
Agreements by a debtor to disavow rights that it would otherwise have in
bankruptcy deserve special consideration. Most of these rights are enjoyed only
through the order of the judge and, usually, at the judge's discretion. No judge,
184 See, e.g., In re Exide Techs., 303 B.R. 48, 69 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (discussing CRO was former Chief
Financial Officer); Keeny v. Larkin, 306 F. Supp. 2d 522, 540 (D. Md. 2003) (CRO was hired to "assist in
the development of the Company's recovery plan."); In re Convenience USA, Inc., 2003 WL 21459559, at
*2 (M.D. N.C. June 17, 2003) (describing terms of restructuring agreement as requiring replacing old
management with new management).
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from the lowest to the highest, welcomes interference with what he regards as his
rightful jurisdiction. None welcomes inhibitions on his discretion or power. So
agreements that limit the debtor's rights in bankruptcy which in turn restrict or
imply restrictions on judges' power are special and inherently more suspect than
other more conventional promises that the DIP might make in its loan agreements.
An obvious solution to many secured creditor fears is to require the DIP to
forego any irksome rights that may have been conferred on him or on the
bankruptcy court by the Code. At the far extreme, one might agree never to file in
chapter 11.185 Despite the academic literature 86 that has proposed the authorization
of corporations without the right to file, no such authorization exists and none is
likely to soon.' 87 Some agreements sniff at the edges of a promise not to file (e.g.,
agreement by members of the board of directors not to vote for filing), but it seems
quite unlikely that any bankruptcy court would recognize any such promise. In
185 But my interviews reveal Cases where a debtor agreed not to file in a certain jurisdiction.
186 See Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1994) (suggesting economic approach to bankruptcy law should allow debtor and creditors to
contractually dictate terms that would govern in event of insolvency).
187 See Hayhoe v. Cole (In re Cole), 226 B.R. 647, 652 n.7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (listing cases denying in
general ability to contract out of bankruptcy rights):
Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1966) (stating, in dictum, advance
agreements to waive benefits of bankruptcy are void); In re Weitzen, 3 F. Supp. 698,
698 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) ("The agreement to waive the benefit of bankruptcy is
unenforceable. To sustain a contractual obligation of this character would frustrate the
object of the Bankruptcy Act .... ); In re Shady Grove Tech. Ctr. Assocs., L.P., 216
B.R. 386, 390 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998) ("Prohibitions against the filing of a bankruptcy
case are unenforceable, self-executing clauses in pre-petition agreements purporting to
provide that no automatic stay arises in a bankruptcy case are contrary to law and hence
unenforceable, and ... self-executing clauses in pre-petition agreements ... to vacate
the automatic stay are likewise unenforceable."); In re Southeast Fin. Assocs., Inc., 212
B.R. 1003, 1005 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (recognizing that a pre-petition waiver of
bankruptcy benefits is not self-executing or binding on third parties); In re Gulf Beach
Dev. Corp., 48 B.R. 40, 43 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984) (stating, in dictum, "the Debtor
cannot be precluded from exercising its right to file Bankruptcy and any contractual
provision to the contrary is unenforceable as a matter of law"); In re Tru Block
Concrete Prods., Inc., 27 B.R. 486, 492 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1983) ("It is a well settled
principal that an advance agreement to waive the benefits conferred by the bankruptcy
laws is wholly void as against public policy"); In re Pease, 195 B.R. 431, 435 (Bankr.
D. Neb. 1996) ("I conclude that any attempt by a creditor in a private pre-bankruptcy
agreement to opt out of the collective consequences of a debtor's future bankruptcy
filing is generally unenforceable. The Bankruptcy Code pre-empts the private right to
contract around its essential provisions, such [as] those found in II U.S.C. § 362"); In
re Madison, 184 B.R. 686, 690 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding pre-petition agreement
to waive debtor's right to file further bankruptcies within 180 days from filing of
debtor's last bankruptcy petition was unenforceable because it violated public policy).
Id.
188 See Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Ipso Facto Clauses and Reality: I Don't Care What the
Documents Provide, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2002, at 28, 52 (suggesting alternate ways of directing firm
to forego filing for bankruptcy would not be practical). The article mentions the "Remote Bankruptcy
Entity", where a firm is created with a creditor on the board requiring unanimous consent for a chapter 11
filing. See id. at 52. It is suggested that in the event of insolvency creditor directors would be forced to resign
in order to avoid a fiduciary duty quandary. See id.
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consumer cases no court would find the right to file waivable; I suspect most courts
would hold the same even for corporate promises. Bankruptcy courts' justification
for holding such promises invalid is likely to be couched in public policy grounds,
but one should remember that bankruptcy judges have one eye on their dockets. If
bankruptcy filings could be promised out of existence, then what is a bankruptcy
judge to do for a living?
There are many more limited promises that DIP's make; many of these will be
enforced, but the case law is thin where the DIP promises not to use its bankruptcy
rights. For example in United Airlines the DIP agreed that its rights under 362 were
"vacated". and "modified." 189 The DIP agreed not to ask for an examiner with
enlarged powers and not to make a variety of motions (e.g., for superpriority for
certain competing claims).1 90
D. Promises to the DIP Lender that Restrict Continuing Creditors such as
Employees
Although the press was full of coverage about how the DIP loan agreement
would force renegotiations of all of United's labor contracts, nothing in the DIP loan
agreement mentions the unions or aircraft lessors or any other continuing creditor
by name.191 Rather it is a condition of the continuation of the loan 92 that the DIP
have certain EBITDAR 93 each month and that it cut expenses by a certain
189 United's DIP loan agreement is on file with author.
190 See id.
191 See id.
192 See Bond, supra note 153, at 26 (describing failure of United to live up to covenants in its financing
agreement would lead to default and foreclosure on United's collateral).
193 Section 6.05 of United's DIP agreement makes the following requirement:
(a) Permit cumulative consolidated EBITDAR for each fiscal period beginning on
December 1, 2002 and ending in each case on the last day of each fiscal month
ending on the dates listed below to be less than the amount specified opposite such
date:
Month EBITDAR
February 28, 2003 $(964,000,000)
March 31, 2003 $(881,000,000)
April 30, 2003 $(849,000,000)
May 31, 2003 $(738,000,000)
June 30, 2003 $(585,000,000)
July 31, 2003 $(448,000,000)
August 31, 2003 $(219,000,000)
September 30, 2003 $(98,000,000)
October 31, 2003 $46,000,000
November 30, 2003 $112,000,000
(b) Permit cumulative consolidated EBITDAR for each rolling twelve (12) fiscal
month period ending on the dates listed below to be less than the amount listed
opposite such month:
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amount.194 On the heels of filing, United successfully 95 renegotiated all of its labor
obligations and it commenced renegotiations of its aircraft leases with undisclosed
results.
Promises of this sort are important for the DIP lender, for its repayment may
depend on the DIP's successful reorganization and success there may-as surely
was true in United-depend on reigning in wage or other expenses. But there is
also a strategic side to these agreements. By agreeing to lose its DIP financing if it
could not renegotiate its collective bargaining agreements to achieve the agreed
savings and profitability, United strengthened its hand with the unions.' 96 Like the
truck driver who gains the upper hand in the game of chicken by throwing his
steering wheel out the window, United's management gained a power with the
unions that it had never had before. So the DIP at United secretly may have
welcomed the requirements on savings and profitability. The agreement
strengthened the hand of both the DIP lender and the DIP at the expense of United's
employees and lessors. Of course United's bankruptcy has not yet been successfully
concluded and the DIP could yet rue the day that it agreed to the clauses on profits
and savings. The day could come when the DIP lender has had enough and wishes
to force United into liquidation and the DIP wants to continue; then their interests
will diverge.
CONCLUSION
Because a chapter 11 proceeding is instituted by the filing of a petition with a
court and because that court and the parties in the proceeding are endowed with
many statutory rights and burdened with many statutory obligations, it is inviting to
think of a chapter 11 as primarily a judicial proceeding, like a civil suit that ends
with a judicial determination of the parties' rights. One might visualize the
conclusion of a chapter 11 as the court's confirmation of one plan of reorganization
because it conforms more closely to the law than another. Alternatively one might
liken a chapter 11 to a proceeding in front of an administrative agency such as
Month EBITDAR
December 31, 2003 $575,000,000
January 31, 2004 $901,000,000
February 28, 2004 $1,084,000,000
March 31, 2004 $1,196,000,000
April 30, 2004 $1,297,000,000
May 31, 2004 $1,383,000,000
194 See Bond, supra note 153, at 26 (describing over two dozen covenants limiting capital spending and
requiring profitability).
5 See Susan Carey, United Air, Union for Ground Staff Reach Agreement, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2003, at
B2 (reaching tentative agreement ground worker's union); Micheline Maynard, United and Pilots' Union
Reach Tentative Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2003, at C5 (reaching tentative agreement with pilots'
union); Micheline Maynard, United and 2 Unions Reach Tentative Agreements, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2003, at
C3 (reaching tentative agreement with flight attendants, dispatchers).
19 See sources cited supra note 195.
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FERC or the FCC where the culmination is an administrative order. None of that
thinking was ever right; today it is farther from the truth than it ever was before.
Ignoring the pesky details of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 that I discuss
above, what I describe in this paper is the rise of a private market for the
reorganization and sale of public companies. I believe that the major effect of the
Code on public companies' bankruptcy is its facilitation of that market. The
participants in this market are the Bankruptcy Courts, the DIP, the professional DIP
lenders, traders in bankruptcy debt, lawyers and investment bankers that specialize
in bankruptcy, and bankruptcy managers (CRO's and others). The firm's assets and
its non-management employees, are like hogs at auction, what is bargained over.
Three parts of the Code have facilitated the growth of this market. First is the
banishing of the Securities and Exchange Commission from chapter 11.197 Second
is the nearly insurmountable conditions for a court's appointment of a trustee that
are found in section 1104. 198 Third is the venue rules discussed in Part VI above. 99
With its right to appoint a trustee in chapter X, and its right to advise on any
proposed plan, the SEC could influence if not control a chapter X. Its right to
appoint (and practice of appointing) a trustee foreclosed existing management and
their lawyers from a significant role in that chapter. It left no one home to negotiate
with a prospective DIP lender or with anyone else. The SEC's right to interfere in
the plan of reorganization and perhaps even to insist on certain terms over the
opposition of the parties burdened the parties' negotiation of a plan. By depriving
the SEC of status of party in interest, section 1109 keeps it even from asking for a
trustee's appointment, for section 1104 permits only a "party in interest" to make
that request.200 So the Code castrated the SEC; no SEC bureaucrat may mess with
this market.
The statement in section 1104(a)(1) that a trustee can be appointed only for
cause, such as "fraud dishonesty ... or gross mismanagement" and the statement
that large size or large numbers of bond or stockholders are not enough to justify a
trustee, has successfully warned the courts away from appointing trustees.20' This
means that no party answerable to an uninvolved actor such as the SEC or a court
appointed trustee will be at the controls in chapter 11. These rules in 1104 and
1109 were consciously chosen to have that effect.
202
197 See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
198 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2002) (listing requirements for appointment of trustee).
199 See supra Part VI.
200 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2002) (giving parties in interest power to request appointment of trustee); 11
U.S.C. § 1109(b) (not including SEC among list of parties in interest).
201 Cf e.g., In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713, 738 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (appointing trustee
where debtor's board of directors had abdicated its fiduciary duty); In re Rivermeadows Assocs., 185 B.R.
615, 619 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1995) (stating trustee may be appointed solely based on pre-petition activities of
debtor's management); In re Bellevue Place Assocs., 171 B.R. 615, 624 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1994) (appointing
trustee when prior agreement deprived management of ability to discharge of fiduciary duties).
202 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1104.02[1] (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 2004) ("The
concept of the debtor remaining in possession recognizes that the debtor's managers are most familiar with
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The third set of rules, those on venue, has had at least as much influence, but
this influence may have been unintended. As I show above, the generous venue
rules allow a debtor and its potential DIP lender to chose among many courts.
20 3




Judges appreciate that the legal issues in large chapter I Is are more interesting
than those in one horse chapter I Is or in the huge gob of chapter 7's that gum up
every bankruptcy court, and they know that the work of the lawyers in big cases
will be carefully done, that the legal issues will be ably and fully argued. So the big
cases will be more interesting than the small; they bring more than intellectual
stimulation, for prominence and prestige also accompany these cases. An important
decision might merit discussion in the popular business press.
205
Understand how the venue rules make this implicit bargain possible. The
judges want big cases and the DIP's and DIP lenders want certainty, favorable law,
and, most of all, laissez faire. Because the offerees' identity (potential DIP's and
DIP lenders) is unknown and because an explicit, bilateral bargain would be at least
unseemly and possibly illegal, this bargain can never be direct, open or, I suspect,
legally binding.20 6 The judges are like the offeror of a unilateral contract. Like
offerors of rewards, the judges necessarily make their offers for the ears of persons
unknown. They make these offers by their decisions, by publishing friendly rules
and, generally, by being laissez faire. They must depend on the offerees' agents-
bankruptcy lawyers-to hear, interpret and report these offers. The acceptance of
the offer is, of course, the act of filing a big chapter 11. The implicit deal between
the judges on the one hand and the DIP and its lender on the other leaves the DIP
and DIP lender free to make a bargain first between themselves and later with
the business and normally will be able to provide the most capable and efficient management during the
chapter II process.").
See supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
204 My interviews disclose several jurisdictions where bankruptcy judges have done things to attract large
chapter I 1 cases. See also Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum
Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1357, 1407 (2000) (arguing forum shopping allows
for insolvent corporations to choose forum maximizing value received from financial investments in firm, so
long as choice is made early). But see Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company
Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom", 54 VAND. L. REv.
231, 248 (2001) (presenting empirical data showing bankruptcy cases filed in Delaware and New York have
higher rate of refiling than ordinary, and arguing some forum-shopped cases may be responsible for higher
refiling rates).
205 For example, entering the terms "Enron bankruptcy", "United bankruptcy" and "Kmart bankruptcy" in a
Google search nets 413, 1430, and 309 news stories, respectively.
206 Some of my interviewees and other bankruptcy lawyers say that judges in three districts have
approached local bankruptcy lawyers to inquire how they might change the rules of judge selection for
chapter 11 cases or otherwise modify their practice in order to attract more of the large cases. Two of those
attempts came to naught; I do not know what happened in the third case. In a fourth jurisdiction one judge
apparently met with potential DIPs before they filed to discuss the kind of first day orders they would seek.




others in the bankruptcy without fear of interference from the court (at least if they
stay within reasonable limits).
While it is more overt than the deal with the judges, the bargain between the
DIP and the DIP lender is not quite forthright. Some of the DIPs most important
promises have little or no effect on the DIP but a large effect on unsecured
creditors. If, for example, the DIP agrees to a rollup of the DIP lender's pre-petition
debt and if no plan of reorganization results, on liquidation the cost of the rollup
will be borne by the unsecured creditors who will receive a smaller payout than they
would have received if the secured creditor's debt had not been rolled up into post-
petition debt.20 7 On liquidation the debtor and its management will be gone.- So to
some degree, the DIP is truly spending from the unsecureds' purse when it strikes a
deal with the DIP lender.
Of course the DIP cannot be a complete whore in its bargain with the DIP
lender. The DIP management may hope to ride out the chapter 11 and continue to
208 thoperate the reorganized company. Since the unsecureds will be a large block of
the new stockholders and since even before that they can stop approval of a plan by
a large enough vote, the managers must have an eye on the unsecureds' interest too.
If the DIP agrees to a deal too favorable to the DIP lender, the unsecured committee
may vote' it down or challenge it in court and, if the deal deviates too far from the
norm, even a laissez faire court will reject it.
209
The unsecureds hold a weaker position in this market than the secureds for
many reasons. First they enjoy none of the benefits of the secured creditors that I
describe above.210 Second since the DIP and the DIP lender choose the venue and so
confer a benefit on the judge, they, not the unsecureds, presumably command the
lion's share of the benefit from that bargain; put differently no judge need fear the
poorly organized rabble of unsecured creditors for they do not choose the venue.11
Only after the case is filed are the unsecureds invited.
Despite the fact that the unsecureds as a class are at the bottom of the
bankruptcy hierarchy, much of the action is with them. Except for the claim of the
DIP lender who goes from beginning to end, both secured and unsecured claims are
bought and sold continuously in a large chapter 11. This part of the market is of
course made possible by the earlier deals among the judge, the DIP and the DIP
lender. Laissez faire not only entices the DIP lender, it also facilitates trades of the
207 See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text; see also Cousins, supra note 178, at 800 (discussing
rollover financing).
208 See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669, 799 (1993) (suggesting rule be
adopted that management seek to maximize value of firm, even when it conflicts with general desire of
management to ride out chapter I 1 and thus keep their jobs).
209 See In re Phase-I Molecular Toxicology, Inc., 285 B.R. 494, 496 (Bankr. N.M. 2002) (rejecting debtor's
post-petition financing plan because court was not convinced it was in creditors' best interest).
210 See supra Parts II-VI; see also Vance & Barr, supra note 151, at 383 (explaining, from unsecured
creditor's point of view, bankruptcy may be meaningless).
211 See Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 799 F.2d 1060, 1068 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating unsecured creditors have
no right to decide venue).
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secured and unsecured debt of the bankrupt. The certainty that comes from a judge
who will not interfere without reason and who has consistent and predictable
behavior makes it simpler for these buyers and sellers to evaluate the worth of
particular claims. A buyer or seller must evaluate the legal rights attached to a
particular claim (its share of the pie) and he must evaluate the worth of the firm on
its exit from chapter 11 (size of the pie). The first is mostly legal, the second is
mostly economic. The laissez faire attitude of the court helps to answer the first, for
it minimizes the chance that an outlier will convince the court to deviate from
shared expectations about the law.
It is often asserted that most claims at the end of a large chapter 11 are not held
by the same persons that held them at the beginning of the case.212 A majority of the
claims have been traded at least once in this market. Without knowing more and
assuming that the participants in this market have no disabilities, economic learning
would say that the presence of a flourishing market in claims is ipso facto
beneficial. Each trader here must think that he benefits from the trade, the buyer to
take part in the bankruptcy and the seller to take his money elsewhere.
The bargaining that we see is probably made easier by the fact that
professionals control it. The DIP lender enters with full understanding of the game;
the unsecureds are recent buyers of the debtor's paper who have paid less than par,
sometimes far less than par. All will be represented by lawyers and investment
bankers skilled at the game. These lawyers must perceive the courts' offer of an
implicit contract and urge their clients to accept it. They must understand not only
the applicable law and practice in the District where the case is filed but, more
important, the informal rules of the market and every other persons' probable
expectations. They appreciate the damage that they can do to others and, better,
that others can do to them. Working With the lawyers' evaluation on the first issue
(size of a claim's share), the investment bankers can evaluate the probable economic
payoff.
I hypothesize that these professional players are less likely to cling to
impossible dreams; in the words of negotiation literature, the original lender may be
"anchored" at 100 cents-his original expectation.213 The bankruptcy pros are more
212 The estimate of all of my informants was that more than half of the debt of most public companies was
not in the same hands at the end of the bankruptcy as it was at the beginning. They noted that the trade debt
was the least likely to be traded, but that corporate bonds were actively traded and that bank debt, even
secured bank debt is often traded. One suggested that the vultures who feast mostly on unsecured debt now
sometimes buy secured debt in order to vote in the secured classes and so inhibit the secured's chance of
hurting their main position as unsecured debt holders.
213 Of course somewhere and sometime the person anchored at 100 cents must have sold to someone else
for far less than 100 cents. Why if he would not settle for far less than 100 cents in the bankruptcy will he
sell for far less to a trader? My interviewees gave uncharacteristically simple-minded opinions on this. One
answer is that the vultures offer money; there will be no payment from the bankrupt estate until the
confirmation and then it may come in stock and not cash. But of course that argument ignores the point that
the vultures' offer is already greatly discounted because of the waiting time and the possibility that the equity
may be worth less than the debtor asserts. Another response is that the vultures are smarter than the
commercial bankers, that the bankers are good at other things, not at valuing failing companies. That answer
too is unsatisfying. Why can't banks hire vultures and so share in the intelligence? The best answer is that
2004]
ABILA WRE VIEW
likely to have a realistic estimate of the probable payoff than inexperienced players
would have and are less likely to be anchored at an unreasonable figure. That of
course means that a bargain is likely to be struck and that no one will be put to the
cost and risk of making the court decide.
The Code's adoption, and its application by the courts may have been necessary
for this market to arise but neither the Code's adoption nor its application by the
courts is sufficient to cause the market to exist. I suspect that the market's rise
depends equally on the growth of chapter I Is by public companies and on the rise
of a class of nationwide specialists
In conclusion I believe it is sensible to think of chapter I Is of public companies
as large and unruly markets where many interrelated deals lead incrementally to a
corporate reorganization. To be sure neither the law nor the courts are irrelevant,
for the private bargain often depends on the courts' power to bind dissenting
members of a class' 4 and the parties derive their bargaining power from rights
granted by Article 9 and by many provisions of the Code. And of course, the judge
must approve the plan and, perhaps, even resolve a conflict or two.
But make no mistake, these plans are not crammed down; they will have the
agreement of every class. The parties will have chosen a venue where an outlier is
unlikely to get his wish from the court and where the outcome negotiated in the
private market and reflecting the economic power of the parties will control. The
Code has made this market possible.
banks are sometimes forced by regulators to write down this debt to unrealistically low prices. Then even a
bad sale improves their balance sheets.
214 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2002) (stating ways class can accept plan); 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(a)(8) (stating court
shall confirm plan if each class of claims or interests "has accepted the plan" or each class "is not impaired
under the plan").
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